American University Law Review
Volume 67

Issue 1

Article 3

2017

The New New Courts
Orna Rabinovich-Einy
University of Haifa, orabin@research.haifa.ac.il

Ethan Katsh
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, katsh@legal.umass.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Rabinovich-Einy, Orna and Katsh, Ethan (2017) "The New New Courts," American University Law Review:
Vol. 67 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

The New New Courts
Abstract
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rise to what we refer to as the "new new courts"). While both developments seem to be motivated by
similar rationales and a desire to increase access to justice, the implications of adopting ADR and ODR
are different. The benefits associated with institutionalizing ADR in terms of access to justice were
perceived primarily in efficiency-related terms due to the assumption that an inherent trade-off exists
between efficiency and fairness. This assumption is now being challenged through ODR in the context of
the new new courts. Because of the qualities of the digital medium and internet communication, ODR
could potentially increase both the efficiency and fairness of dispute resolution processes, formal and
informal. At the same time, the new new courts, precisely because of their reliance on algorithms and
data, present novel challenges to fairness and open the door to new sources of danger for disputants and
the judicial system.
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In this Article we describe the phenomenon of online courts, which is fast
gaining momentum, and analyze these "new new courts" from an access to
justice perspective. We distinguish between two turningpoints in terms of access
to justiceand courts: the riseof alternativedisputeresolution (ADR) (producing
what we refer to as the "new courts") and the spread of online dispute resolution
(ODR) (givingrise to what we refer to as the "new new courts"). While both
developments seem to be motivated by similarrationalesand a desire to increase
access to justice, the implicationsof adoptingADR and ODR are different. The
benefits associatedwith institutionalizingADR in terms of access to justice were
perceived primarily in efficiency-related terms due to the assumption that an
inherent trade-offexists between efficiency andfairness. This assumption is now
being challenged through ODR in the context of the new new courts. Because of
the qualities of the digital medium and internet communication, ODR could
potentially increase both the efficiency and fairness of dispute resolutionprocesses,
formal and informal. At the same time, the new new courts, precisely because of
their reliance on algorithms and data, present novel challenges to fairness and
open the door to new sources of dangerfordisputants and the judicialsystem.
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"[If as is overwhelmingly the case, our existing regulatory scheme
has resulted in a system in which lawyers' help lies beyond the reach
of the ordinay citizen, then it is within the power-and the duty-of
courts to expand access to other sources and types of legal help. The
innovatorsfor law arejust waitingfor the call."
1
-Gillian K Hadfield
INTRODUCTION

In a recent column, Thomas Friedman noted that we have reached
a "tipping point" with respect to the internet, one in which "a critical
mass of our lives and work" take place online, "[t] hat is to say, a critical
mass of our interactions have moved to a realm where [we are] all
connected but no one is in charge. After all, there are no stoplights in
cyberspace, no police officers walking the beat, no courts,no judges ....2
In actuality, there are courts that currently operate online. In July
2016, the United Kingdom court system announced a radical reform:
£730 million would be allocated to revolutionize the technology of the
British court system, a major component of which would be the
institution of a new online court charged with addressing small claims
of up to £25,000. s Several months earlier, another online court was
introduced in British Columbia in the form of a tribunal, established
through legislation, mandating an online avenue for small claims of

1. Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Ways Courts
Regulate Legal Markets, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 83, 93.
2. Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Online and Scared, NY TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/1 /opinion/online-and-scared.html
(second
emphasis added).
3. See infra Section II.B.3.
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up to Can$5000 and "strata," certain neighbor-related, claims.4 In the
Netherlands, a platform called Rechtwijzer until recently allowed
divorcing couples and disputing neighbors to resolve their cases
online. 5 In addition, a few dozen U.S. state courts have successfully
implemented Matterhorn software for the online processing of outstanding
warrant cases and traffic violations.6 Also, a pilot of online proceedings
for debt collection cases is being devised for the New York court system.7
What these and other courts have done is remarkable. Instead of
refining existing court procedures through technology, they have
developed novel processes that draw on the unique qualities of digital
technology; such novel processes rely on new tools, involve new actors,
and fulfill new goals. They are the "new new courts."
There are various prisms through which one can evaluate this new
phenomenon, such as examining its impact on the litigation process,
the role ofjudges, or the legitimacy of the courts. The focus here is to
determine what the new new courts mean in terms of "access to
justice," a long-time goal of justice and one of its greatest deficits. In
recent decades, there have been two major developments in terms of
access to justice and courts: the rise of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) and the spread of online dispute resolution (ODR).' While
both movements seem to be motivated by similar rationales,
specifically the understanding that different types of disputes often
require different procedural avenues for addressing them, the
implications of adopting ADR and ODR in courts are different.9
With ADR, many legal claims were siphoned from courts to
alternative avenues such as mediation, but to a large extent, these ADR
processes remained adversarial, with legal actors playing a frequent
4.

CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, https://www.civilresolutionbc.ca (last visited Oct.

23, 2017).
5. Maurits Barendrecht, Rechtwijzer" Why Online SupportedDispute ResolutionIs Hard
to Implement, HIIL (June 21, 2017), http://www.hiil.org/insight/rechtwijzer-whyonline-supporte-dispute-resolution-is-hard-to-implement.
6. Anna Stolley Persky, MichiganProgramAllows People to Resolve Legal Issues Online,
ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/home court advantage.
7. New York Online Dispute Resolution, ABA CENTER FOR INNOVATION,
http://abacenterforinnovation.org/programs-and-projects/collaboration/new-yorkonline-dispute-resolution (last visited on Oct. 23, 2017).
8. See infra Section I.A. (ADR); Section II.B. (ODR).
9. In the case of both ADR and ODR, the courts institutionalized processes
characteristic of a traditional court setting in an attempt to increase access to justice.
Ethan Katsh & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Access to DigitalJustice:FairandEfficient Processes
for the Modern Age, 18 CARDOZOJ. OF CONFLICT RES. 637, 638-40 (2017).
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role and outcomes echoing substantive legal endowments.
The
benefits associated with institutionalizing ADR in terms of access to
justice were perceived primarily in efficiency-related terms.1
Still,
these were the "new courts."
The new courts came with a novel understanding of access tojustice:
one that was realized in "many rooms" (beyond litigation) and
required that "process pluralism" become widespread, with new
practices and goals permeating the litigation process and re-shaping
conceptions about the role of judges and courts, albeit, mostly in
efficiency-related terms. 2 Indeed, underlying these developments was
the assumption that an inherent trade-off existed between efficiency
and fairness.1
This assumption posed a real challenge to efforts to
enhance access to justice through ADR and gave rise to serious

10. See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 406-09 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,

DISPUTE RESOLUTION] (addressing the various implications of mediation on court
proceedings); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on
Looking: Lessonsfrom the Institutionalizationof Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. LJ. 399,
407-08 (2004) (discussing the institutionalization of ADR in Minnesota after
legislation allowed courts to mandate non-binding ADR, even when the parties
objected); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The "New Arbitration,"17 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 61, 73-89 (2012) (analyzing the ways in which the mediation process has come
to resemble arbitration); Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of CourtConnected ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 874 (2012) (noting that while ADR may achieve
communication and outcomes that would be unlikely in court, over time it "has strayed
from its core mission ... and ... has become entangled in the contentious game
playing and covert manipulation that can occur in litigation").
11. SeeJacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, CourtMediation and the SearchforJustice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 62 (1996) (comparing the perception that courts have
adopted mediation as a way to more peacefully resolve disputes with the reality that
courts seek efficiency and lighter dockets).
12. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts,Private Ordering,andIndigenous
Law, 13J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 3-4 (1981) ("Is the utopia of access tojustice a condition
in which all disputes are fully adjudicated? Surely not ....
We know enough about
the work of courts to suspect that such a condition would be monstrous in its own
way."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lecture, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 561-63 (2006) [hereinafter Carrie MenkelMeadow, Peace andJustice] (discussing Professor Lon Fuller's ten conceptions of legal
processes, or "process pluralism," including arbitration and mediation); see also Orna
Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency and the
Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN.J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 6-12 (2016) (exploring
how the shift toward ADR was driven by efficiency concerns and backlogs of cases for
courts).
13. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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critiques of the new courts.14 This same assumption is now being
5
challenged through ODR in the new new courts.
Because of the distinct qualities of the digital medium and internet
communication, ODR holds the potential to increase the efficiency
and fairness of dispute resolution processes, both formal and informal.
The ability of disputants to conveniently and inexpensively access the
court system, and receive tailored legal information creates fertile
ground for simplifying court processes, reducing the cost and length
of the proceedings, and enhancing courts' abilities to perform in a
consistent, context-specific, and equitable manner."
These
improvements are possible because legal information is delivered in
simple language using algorithms that tailor such information to the
particular context. In addition, use of algorithms in dispute resolution
allows for convenient communication from afar at all hours, as well as
the monitoring of the quality of such processes through the collection
of data exchanged during ODR proceedings and, ultimately, the
improvement of ODR processes' design.1 7 At the same time, the new
new courts, precisely because of their reliance on algorithms and data,
present new challenges to fairness and open the door to new sources
of danger for disputants and the judicial system.1
Part I analyzes the evolution of the new courts from an access to
justice perspective by explaining the efficiency-fairness trade-off and
the resulting tension between the expansion of access to justice
through ADR and the critiques of privatejustice. Part II then describes
the roots of the phenomenon of the new new courts and provides
several examples of such courts that are already, or will soon be, in
operation. These examples illuminate the ways in which the new new
courts differ from their predecessors from an access to justice
perspective. The Article concludes by offering some thoughts on the
future direction courts will take considering the developments described

14. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (describing the common
criticisms of ADR, including the argument that thejudicial process is inherently public
and ADR privatizes justice).
15. See infra Section II.C.
16. For a more thorough description of the existing new new courts, see infra
Section II.B.
17. See infra Section II.B.
18. See infra notes 241-42, 268-81 and accompanying text (discussing how ODR
may challenge the traditional roles of the actors in the judicial system and how
algorithms may institutionalize certain biases).
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in this Article, in particular the potential impact of the spread of the
new new courts on access to justice and the fairness of courts' operation.
I.

ACCESS TOJUSTICE, ADR, AND THE NEW COURT

In this section, we describe the rise of the new courts. We uncover
the transformation of courts from litigation-centered institutions to
ones that incorporate ADR processes and often substitute judicial
decision-making with consensual resolutions. As we show, to a large
extent, the driving force behind these developments was the desire to
enhance access tojustice and reduce the many barriers associated with
access to courts and the law. The hope that the new courts would be
more accessible than their predecessors was not realized in full.
Specifically, the focus on enhancing the efficiency of court
proceedings through ADR often came at the expense of fairness and
the quest for a non-adversarial vision ofjustice. This reality generated
new concerns over private justice and novel challenges for litigants, in
particular those belonging to disempowered groups.
A.

The Rise of ADR

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the American court system
changed dramatically. Up until then, the court system offered formal
adversarial litigation proceedings as the sole avenue for addressing court
cases.19 Yet, towards the end of the twentieth century, court proceedings
gradually came to incorporate ADR processes-mostly mediation but
also arbitration-in which other actors operated as third-party neutrals
assisting in the resolution of claims on the court docket. 0
The sources of the ADR revolution in courts were diverse, but the
shift from traditional adversarial litigation is most strongly associated
with the Pound Conference.2 1 The 1976 conference was a gathering
of over one hundred participants from the legal milieu-judges,
attorneys, academics-all of whom discussed the ills of the court

19. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165, 174
(2003).
20. See id. at 178 (discussing the rise of ADR as a way to decide cases outside of the
courtroom).
21. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of
America: From the Formal to the Informal to the "Semi-Formal," in REGULATING DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TOJUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419, 420 (Felix Steffek et
al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal].
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system, the sources of the court system's problems, and the possible
22
solutions to those problems.
The principal problems discussed in the conference were the high
costs associated with a slow, complex, and overburdened system.2 ' The
adoption of ADR processes came to be seen as an important avenue
for addressing these issues. In what is now regarded as a seminal
speech, Professor Frank Sander called for the institution of a "multidoor courthouse," thereby advocating the need to diversify court
proceedings through the adoption of a variety of procedural options
that could address the deficits of court proceedings. 24 Indeed, Sander,
'' 2
in his subsequent formulation of "fitting the forum to the fuss,
recognized that different types of disputes, parties, and circumstances
merited different procedural options; other scholars writing on ADR
procedures reached a similar conclusion, as evidenced in Professor
Menkel-Meadow's notion of "process pluralism. "26
In what ways could ADR address the difficulties associated with the
courts? The rationales for adopting ADR processes relate to the
benefits that run along three inter-connected axes: efficiency-quality,
procedure-substance, and individual-group.
As for the first axis, the benefits associated with ADR over courts had
to do with both efficiency-related considerations, such as the desire to
reduce the caseload of the courts, and qualitative reasons, mainly the
appeal of interest-based, non-adversarial dispute resolution avenues, as
explained below.
In terms of efficiency, the expectation was that the
institutionalization of ADR processes would take pressure off the courts
for two reasons. First, some of the court cases would be channeled to
other fora, reducing the number of cases that courts would have to
resolve through litigation and, perhaps more importantly,
contributing, in the long-run, to the understanding of the courthouse
as a site in which diverse processes are being offered, moving beyond
22.

Id.
SeeJEROLD S. AUERBACH,JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 95 (1983) (describing the legal
system of the time as "a horse-and-buggy [system] near collapse in an urban industrial
society").
24. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ONJUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 83-84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler
eds., 1979).
25. Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure,10 NEGOT.J. 49, 66 (1994).
26. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice, supra note 12, at 561-63 (laying
out the foundation of "process pluralism").

23.
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a litigation-centric worldview. Such changes would allow courts to
process a more limited caseload with greater efficiency and reduce related
costs. 2 7 Second, the adoption of ADR was expected to lower costs since
these alternatives were perceived as inherently more efficient than
litigation because they were, at least in the context of mediation, much
quicker and simpler than litigation and therefore less costly.2"
Some ADR proponents did not focus on the high costs or lengthy
waits associated with litigation, but instead emphasized the appeal of
interest-based dispute resolution over adversarial proceedings. In
their view, the key reason for adopting ADR had to do with qualityrelated rationales associated with the other two axes mentioned above:
(1) the advantages that run along the procedural-substantive divide
and (2) the benefits conferred by ADR processes from both an
individual and group perspective. 29
The implementation of ADR with the above goals in mind, involved
a number of potential advantages. In terms of the process, it was
claimed that ADR could generate more satisfaction, engender a higher
degree of perceived fairness, and provide a more amicable process that
would allow the preservation or restoration of ongoing relationships
for individual disputants and within communities."
As for the substantive level, the shift from rights to interests produce
different, more creative outcomes than those reached by courts could.
The ADR process did not need to comport with legal norms and could
reflect individual preferences or local norms. Also, because of the
parties' active role in producing such agreements, they are thought to
be more stable outcomes than those dictated by ajudge 1

27.

See Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal, supra note 21, at 447-48 (listing such

parameters as objective measures for the assessment of dispute resolution processes).
28. Id. at 447.
29. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or "The Law ofADR, "19 FLA. ST.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991) [hereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement] (describing the benefits of ADR, but noting its
potential shortcomings in practice such as reduced fairness and justice); see also
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 10, at 228 (explaining how
mediation may help individuals better understand the opposing party's perspective);
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211, 211 (2004) (reporting on
three experiments that analyzed the reasons for ADR preference including procedural
and decisional control).
30. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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Both the procedural and substantive advantages offered through
mediation-the principal ADR process institutionalized in the
courts-are tied to mediation's vision of justice: 'justice from below"
instead of 'justice from above."3 2 Under such an alternative vision,
parties' interests rather than their rights occupy center stage, and the
parties' goal is to reach "win-win" resolutions that address both parties'
interests rather than win-lose decisions.3 Moreover, such an approach
allows parties a central role in voicing their desires and needs and in
the decision making phase, which gives rise to a new understanding of
the role of legal professionals as problem solvers. 4
Mediation's shift from "rights" to "interests," and from an adversarial
process to a relational one, has been particularly important in
resolving conflict between parties with pre-existing relationships."
Adversarial litigation is infamous for driving parties towards extreme
positions, escalating the degree of conflict, and over-simplifying the
facts. 6
Through mediation, the parties could enhance their
understanding of one another, allowing them to address the source of
their problem and develop tools for communicating and problemsolving in the future.
In addition, mediation proceedings have the potential to enhance
parties' perception of the fairness of the process and the legitimacy of
32. Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into
Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 160 n.3 (2002).
33. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-55 (1981) (directing that one should negotiate based on each
party's underlying interests, rather than positions, in order to reach an optimal
outcome for both parties).
34. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 757-58 (1983) (noting how the
problem-solving model can reach more optimal outcomes because advocates focus on
actual objectives rather than assumed objectives).
35. See FISHER & URY, supra note 33, at 19-21 (explaining that negotiators must
keep in mind that the opposing party is a human being with their own expectations
and values); Hensler, supra note 19, at 190 (describing how mediation should be
transformative, not outcome-based, giving the parties a greater understanding of
themselves and the other party); see also Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Prelimina
Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 303-04 (2002) (stating
that there is "great value to using non-adjudicative approaches in many situations").
36. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversa System in a PostModern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 17-18 (1996) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, The Trouble with the Adversa
System] (describing the "dilemma of
oppositional, binary thinking at trial" and how it potentially undermines the legitimacy
of proceedings).
37. MENKEL-MEADOWETAL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 10, at 228.
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the bodies offering mediation. Research in the field of "procedural
justice""8 has shown that, in determining the fairness of dispute
resolution processes, litigants attach a great deal of significance to the
following factors: (1) whether they were given an opportunity to "tell
their stories"; (2) whether the third party considered their views; (3)
whether the third party "treated them in an even-handed and dignified
manner"; and (4) whether the third party was impartial. 9 The significance
of these factors on parties' perception of fairness has proven to hold,
regardless of whether a given party has prevailed with respect to the
ultimate outcome, and has been found to color parties' perception of
the legitimacy of the body conducting the process.4" While procedural
justice can be realized in litigation, the reality of overburdened court
proceedings can render informal mediation sessions a more likely process
for exercising one's voice and realizing one's "day in court."41
Beyond reducing friction between the parties and generating
perceptions of fairness and legitimacy, the shift from rights to interests
can also allow parties to devise resolutions that are more beneficial and
38. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 93 (1988) (emphasizing the important role of procedural fairness judgments
in determining individuals' preference for specific dispute resolution procedures);
JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

67-68 (1975) (examining factors used to assess what procedures are utilized when
resolving disputes, the effects both on those currently in dispute, as well as on those in
the future); Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insightsfrom
Proceduraland Social Justice Theories, 54J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 49, 53-54 (2004) (discussing
the theories explaining why parties assign high significance to procedural justice).
39. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What'sJustice Got to
Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817 (2001). Other studies mention additional,
sometimes complementing elements, but the components described by Professor
Welsh seem to be widely agreed upon.
40. See John M. Connely & William M. O'Barr, Hearing the Hidden Agenda: The
EthnographicInvestigation of Procedure, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 184-88 (1998)
(describing a prevailing litigant's dissatisfied experience with ajudge, and explaining
that "paying attention to what litigants say rather than acting on assumptions about
their objectives and concerns" will produce greater "litigant satisfaction"); E. Allan
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluationsof theirExperiences of the
Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 953, 957-60 (1990) (noting that social
exchange and interdependence theories posit that outcome satisfaction is based on
"personal standards or expectations" as opposed to an objective standard); Tom R.
Tyler, PsychologicalPerspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375,
382 (2006) (highlighting fairness as the cornerstone of an individual's willingness to
"defer to the decisions of authorities and to the rules created by institutions").
41. This depends on the model of mediation employed. For a critique of some
forms of mediation from a procedural justice perspective, see Welsh, supra note 39, at
838-58.
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satisfactory to both sides. This occurs because civil legal remedies are
typically monetary, which results either in a win-lose solution or a
compromise in which courts award a sum that lies somewhere between
what one side demanded and the other was willing to concede.42 By
uncovering the interests that underlie the legal positions parties have
adopted, novel opportunities for creative solutions emerge, extending
beyond a court's "limited remedial imagination."4
The process
through which parties uncover their interests and needs in mediation
and brainstorm about possible solutions that address such interests
and needs can generate more creative, tailored, and imaginative
solutions.44 Furthermore, mediated resolution may be more resilient
because, as research has indicated, disputants are more likely to abide
by the resolution if they have a role in shaping the agreement.4
In assessing ADR vis-aL-vis the court option, the advantages for
individual disputants were typically highlighted-namely the promise
of a quicker, less expensive, more pleasant, flexible, and satisfactory
process that could yield better and longer-lasting solutions.46
Alongside these voices, there were also ADR proponents who adopted
a broader perspective by emphasizing the opportunity provided by
ADR-mainly mediation-for the empowerment of disadvantaged
groups. These advocates of ADR focused on the ways in which the
formal legal system was often an oppressive force for parties belonging
to disempowered groups, and the courts were a site where foreign
norms were employed.4 7 Mediation, by contrast, offered members of
such groups an opportunity to expand their problem-solving skills and
to draw on local norms.4 " Interestingly, the broader group perspective
42.

MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 10 (1986).

43. Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement, supra note 29, at 7. Critiques of court
remedies were in fact part of a much broader criticism of litigation as a process that is
adversarial and rule-oriented, instead of addressing parties' needs and interests. See
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversay System, supra note 36, at 7, 15.
44. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982)
(describing the advantages that mediation has over adversarial proceedings such as
being more hospitable to individual circumstances).
45. See Lawrence H. Cooke, Mediation: A Boon or a Bust?, 28 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 3,
12 (1983) (asserting that because mediation requires parties to shape the terms of the
final agreement, parties tend to become personally bound to the resolution and
respect the outcome).
46. Id.
47. See Hensler, supra note 19, at 170 (describing the "community justice
movement," which embodies the belief that "formal legal institutions, including
courts, are mechanisms for maintaining the power of elite groups").
48. Id. at 171.
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was also at the heart of much of the criticism that would later be voiced
against the growing privatization of justice, in particular its impact on
minorities4 9 and women .5' These concerns remained pertinent in the
1990s with the growing institutionalization of ADR through the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 199051 and the Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,52
but were also pacified as ADR became an inherent part of the
contemporary justice system.
B.

ADR and Access to Justice

Parallel to the ADR movement and for many of the same reasons, an
access to justice" movement emerged, calling for equal access to the
4
legal system, as well as just outcomes, both individually and socially.5
The movement underscored the gap that exists between the legal
system's promise of equal justice and rule of law on the one hand and
a reality in which certain disputants are disadvantaged in their ability
to enter the system, employ legal procedures, and reach favorable legal
outcomes on the other hand.
While its original call for action
centered on legal aid reform, as a result of its focus on lowering the
costs associated with litigation for litigants from a poor socio-economic
background, the access to justice movement's later agenda expanded
to include other procedural avenues for making legal procedures

49. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk ofPrejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1360 n.8 (1985) (arguing that
deformalizing the legal process through ADR "increases the likelihood of prejudice
against ethnic minorities of color").
50. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545,1601 (1991) (arguing that mandatory mediation in divorce proceedings
disadvantages women by coercing them to conform to societal norms while
confronting an ex-spouse).
51. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2012)).
52. Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2012)).
53. See Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal, supra note 21, at 421 (outlining the legal
sources of dispute resolution in the United States);Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 609 (2005) (recounting Congress's efforts to promote
ADR by authorizing it or requiring it under certain statutes, including the Dispute
Resolution Act); Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1055, 1055-57 (1996) (discussing the rise of ADR through its implementation
by federal agencies and consideration in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and local
court rules).
54. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 181, 182 (1978).
55. Sagit Mor, WithJustice andAccessforAll, 39 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 2) (on file with authors).
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simpler to initiate and use, such as small claims courts and class
action. 6 Over the years, the access to justice movement came to view
the institutionalization of ADR as a central component in realizing its
goals: making courts easier to access and making court procedures
7
and outcomes more just
Why would ADR processes be successful in reducing the various
barriers to access that are associated with courts and enhancing access
tojustice? To answer this question, we need a better understanding of
the meaning of access to justice and the nature of the barriers
preventing such access. In a recent article, Professor Sagit Mor
distinguishes between three levels of access, each of which is associated
with different, and sometimes overlapping, types of barriers." While
Mor discusses these barriers in the context of disability, the
terminology is relevant to the discussion of access to justice more
generally and can be instrumental in exploring the ways in which the
mediation process-the prominent ADR process adopted in courtswas expected to lower access barriers.
The first level of access Mor discusses is "access to the legal system"
and the related "entry barriers." 9 Such barriers include monetary
impediments associated with court fees and having to retain a lawyer.
Indeed, the costs of the legal process typically occupy center stage
when discussing access and barriers, but Mor defines barriers relating
to this realm of access more broadly to include additional formal, physical,
and procedural barriers, such as rules regarding legal capacity of
claimants or court buildings that are inaccessible to the disabled. 0
Mediation was expected to increase access to the legal system both
directly and indirectly. By redirecting some court cases to mediation,
ADR could provide much-needed relief from traditional legal
proceedings; mediation was informal, efficient, and inexpensive,
thereby reducing the direct and indirect costs associated with the court
option. While the desire to reduce costs was a concern for the entire
system, as evidenced by the Pound Conference, the courts' high costs
present a particularly acute problem for disputants from a low socio-

56. MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYANT GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 21
(1978) (discussing the successive "waves" of approaches to access tojustice problems).
57. Id. at 55-59; Mor, supra note 55 (manuscript at 27-29) (discussing the
accessibility issues with legal proceedings, including the "structural, spatial, mental,
and other process related barriers affected one's ability to utilize the law").
58. CAPPELLETTI & GARTH, supra note 56, at 21.
59. Mor, supra note 55 (manuscript at 4).
60. Id. (manuscript at 21).
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economic background, a major concern for the access to justice
movement.6 1 As for other formal or physical barriers, the flexibility
associated with mediation could allow parties to overcome legal
limitations or to convene in accessible sites.
The second level of access Mor discusses is "access to law," which
refers to the legal process and to legal consciousness.62 This level of
access draws attention to a myriad of structural, cultural, and
psychological barriers that constrain certain parties' ability to make use
of litigation even where no formal barrier exists."
Barriers that
operate on the access to law realm include the geographic spread of
courts between center and periphery and the availability of high
quality translation and access to legal information.6 4
In these contexts, ADR seemed to promise reduced hardship. The
informal, interest-based and non-adversarial nature of ADR could
reduce psychological inhibitions, such as fear of exposure in open
court.6 5 In addition, the option of referring parties from court to local
community-based mediation centers, whose establishment requires
fewer resources, could improve the geographic reach of such services.
Furthermore, a tailored ADR process in which the parties devise the
applicable norms and outcomes reached could overcome both
linguistic and cultural differences.66 Finally, the shift from rights to
interests and needs in mediation could make less stark the disparities
67
between parties in terms of legal information and strategy.
The third, and final, level of access that Mor references is "access to
justice," a barrier that stands in the way of 'just outcomes" and involves
the structure and content of legal rules and decisions.68 Included in this
61. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1788 (2000)
(discussing the challenges low-income civil litigants face and the dearth of resources
available to help them).

62.
63.
64.

Mor, supra note 55 (manuscript at 21).
Id.
Id.

65. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mhen Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals,44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1873 (1997) [hereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals] (stating that "ADR provides a
place in which disputes can be settled privately, without embarrassing the parties").
66. See CATHERINE BELL & DAVID KAHANE, INTERCULTURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
ABORIGINAL CONTEXTS 313 (2013) (noting that ADR can be more culturally-sensitive
and less hierarchical than litigation).
67. See Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals,supra note 65, at 1872
(emphasizing the differences between a rights-based litigation process and an interestbased mediation).
68. Mor, supra note 55 (manuscript at 22).
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category are those instances in which the grievances suffered by certain
individuals and groups have not been recognized as legal wrongs.69
Also included in these types of biases are the various realms in which
"repeat players" have advantages over "one-shotters '' 70 in litigation.
Repeat players have a deep familiarity with the system and can use the
71
system to create rules that play to their advantage in future cases.
In terms of outcomes and repeat player advantages, mediation,
because it relies on interests rather than rights, is not supposed to
confer benefits on those who have more power to shape legal
endowments, have prior experience, and are expected to have future
dealings with the legal system.72 While some mediated outcomes have
objective value, others can be difficult to measure and compare. For
example, what value do we assign to an apology or a promise to
communicate with one another in a respectful manner?
In all the realms described above, the institutionalization of ADR was
viewed as a promising route for enhancing access tojustice. The reality
of institutionalized ADR, however, proved to be more complex, as
evidenced by the heated debate that accompanied the adoption of
ADR.73 One major line of attack against ADR, most prominently
associated with Professor Owen Fiss, was premised on the view that
courts were a public body, endowed with the authority for resolving
legal disputes, and such authority should not be delegated to a private,
alternative forum. 74
When courts refer cases to mediation or
encourage parties to settle, they are draining the lifeline that allows

69. See id. (explaining that barriers may prevent interested parties from advocating
for laws protecting their interests).
70. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"Come out Ahead: Speculationson the Limits ofLegal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-98 (1974) (explaining that "one-shotters" are firsttime disputants who are disadvantaged by their unfamiliarity with courts' processes).
71. For an analysis of the structural advantages repeat players have over oneshotters, see id. at 124-25.
72. For an exploration of the ways in which ADR processes can nonetheless
produce advantages for repeat players, see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the
"Haves" Come OutAhead in Alternativejustice Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST.
J. DisP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
73. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
74. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that
ADR should not be institutionalized because "[c] onsent is often coerced; the bargain
may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment
renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are
trimmed, justice may not be done"); see also Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal, supra note
21, at 419 (explaining the access to justice issues associated with privatizingjustice).
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courts to develop the law: create and revise precedents, declare societal
values, and provide a balanced venue for airing disputes between litigants. 7
Other critics emphasized the dangers that ADR processes could pose
for particular groups of disputants, such as women, minorities, and
consumers, vis-A-vis their more powerful, wealthy, and experienced
counterparts. 76 These groups were precisely the ones that ADR was
supposed to increase access to justice for, and the concern that ADR
was offering members of these groups second-class justice was a grave
one. ADR presented a challenge for members of disadvantaged groups
precisely because of the qualities that made such processes more
77
appealing to them than litigation: their confidentiality and flexibility.
These qualities gave the impression that rights were irrelevant and
parties could forego legal representation when in fact ADR processes
were conducted "in the shadow of the law" and therefore knowing
one's rights often proved important, providing those who were already
more powerful with an advantage.78
The veil of secrecy that
surrounded ADR made it ever more difficult to ensure quality control,
eradicate bias and guarantee fair outcomes. 79 The focus on needs and
interests in this closed setting was said to depoliticize potential claims,
such as discrimination, by transforming them into private
misunderstandings that grew out of "miscommunication. '0
75.

Fiss, supra note 74, at 1075-76.

76. See Delgado et al., supra note 49, at 1360-61 (arguing that ADR may reinforce
class-based prejudices); Grillo, supra note 50, at 1556-57 (discussing the ways in which
mandatory divorce mediation can be particularly harmful to women); Laura Nader,
Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1002-03 (1979) (highlighting the
issues facing the processing of consumer complaints).
77. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact: The Questfor a New Paradigmfor
Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 263-65 (2006) [hereinafter
Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact] (describing this dynamic as the accountability
dilemma in mediation).
78. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 968, 997 (1979).
79. See Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact, supra note 77, at 263-65 (positing that
"two of mediation's core features-confidentiality and flexibility-have stood in the
way of establishing effective formal and informal accountability mechanisms").

80.

See

RICHARD

ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE:

THE AMERICAN

283 (1982) (describing the effectiveness of informal processes in
neutralizing people's instincts of antagonism and vindication in the adversarial

EXPERIENCE

process);

CHRISTINE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION

HARRINGTON,
SHADOW JUSTICE:
OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 44-45

THE

IDEOLOGY

AND

(1985); Sara Cobb, The

Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 397, 411-12 (1997); Lauren
B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the
Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497, 514 (1993); Hensler, supra note 19, at 196; Laura
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In essence, what ADR critics were claiming was that enhanced
'access" came at a cost to 'justice," as a result of the inherent trade-off
that exists between "fairness"-consistency and other values achieved
through due process protections-and "efficiency"-realized through
flexible and tailored processes of ADR. 1
Regardless of the critiques, institutionalization of ADR processes
proceeded full steam ahead in a wide range of arenas, including courts
and other public bodies, as well as communities, educational settings
and workplace organizations. 2 Despite the ongoing reference to ADR
as informal processes and litigation as the formal avenue for resolving
disputes, the sharp dichotomy between these processes, to the extent
one ever existed, was blurred and the new court emerged.
C.

The New Court

The growth of ADR procedures challenged the traditional
understanding of access tojustice. As described above, with the spread
of mediation in courts there was a different vision of justice, one in
which meeting individual interests and needs was prioritized over the
protection of rights and the establishment of standards. Consensual
resolutions became preferred over judicial decisions.8 3 Recognizing
the value of ADR, courts referred many cases to mediation, and

Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (1993).
81. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 86 (2004) (examining the shortcomings of certain ADR efforts and expressing the efficiency-fairness trade-off in such
questions as "[h] ow can informal tribunals provide adequate procedural protections
and prevent the exploitation or coercion of weaker, unrepresented parties?"). Indeed,
the trade-off conception is so strong that it continues to color the discussion on ODR.
See Anjanette H. Raymond & ScottJ. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and Access toJustice:
Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?,35 MICH.J. INT'L L. 485, 487 (2014) (arguing
that the trade-off of efficiency at the sake ofjustice has given countries pause in using
ODR). The writing on ODR has also assumed the existence of a trade-off. SeeJULIA
H6RNLE, CROSS-BORDER INTERNET DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17 (2009) (discussing the
conflict between effectiveness and due process in ODR); ARNO R. LODDER &JOHN
ZELEZNIKOW,

ENHANCED DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY 21 (2010) (stating that mediation may not provide all the same
procedural safeguards as litigation but is cheaper and faster).
82. Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal,supra note 21, at 425.
83. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only Way: Consensus
Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 37, 42-43
(2002) (arguing that the outcomes of consensus decisions are "qualitatively better"
than the outcomes dictated by third parties).
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litigation became the exception.8 4
Nevertheless, court decisions
maintained their influence as mediators and arbitrators crafted their
decisions and resolutions in accordance with legal endowments.
As described above, ADR processes were not always successful in
realizing swifter, cheaper, and less adversarial dispute resolution
processes. While ADR sought to reduce access barriers, it could not
eliminate them because parties still had to meet, occupy space, and
employ a third party whose time and capacity were limited. 6 In
addition, as ADR processes were assimilated in courts and ADR
techniques were being employed by judges, 7 the courts "co-opted"
mediation. 8 The reality of court-annexed mediation was very different
than the promise for a context-specific tailored process that maximized
party autonomy, participation, and control." Studies have shown that
mediators tend to be evaluative while providing assessments of the
likely outcome of litigation and the optimal resolution of the dispute,
and lawyers tend to play a central role, at the expense of parties who
are pushed aside and oftentimes not even present."0
84. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Tial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 514-15, 517 (2004)
(reasoning that the significant decline in trials is caused by the prevailing use of
alternative forums used for dispute resolution because of their ease of access-no
court filings required-and lower costs, among other factors).
85. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 78, at 966.
86. For a discussion about the barriers to the legal system see Mor, supra note 55
(manuscript at 21-23).
87. See Michal Alberstein, Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudencefor
an EmergingJudicial Practice, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 879, 898-905 (2014)
(discussing various forms of judicial conflict resolution); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARv.L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982) (examining the shift of federaljudges away
from disengagement and impartiality in decision making toward a more managerial
role).
88. See Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal, supra note 21, at 419 (explaining that ADR
was supposed to challenge "formalistic and legalistic approaches" characteristic of
court proceedings, and has instead become institutionalized, imposing similar barriers
to access to justice).
89. See Welsh, supra note 39, at 788-89 (opining that the reality of ADR does not
match the ideals exposed by its proponents).
90. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 10, at 406-09
(addressing the various implications of mandatory mediation on the nature of the
process); see also McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 10, at 407-08 (describing the
institutionalization of ADR in Minnesota and how it is mostly "lawyer-driven");
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at 73-89 (examining the increasingly
prominent role lawyers have in mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional
State of Court-ConnectedADR, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 873, 874 (2012) (describing mediation's
shift to resembling the adversarial nature of litigation).
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Similarly, courts were influenced by the flexibility and informality of
ADR, echoing concerns about their preference of efficiency over
fairness, and access over justice. During the last decades of the
twentieth century, the judicial practice began to shift with the rise of
what is known as "managerial judging" and the explicit incentives
provided to judges to promote settlement by either referring cases to
ADR or advancing settlement by the judges themselves.91 The role of
judges was altered dramatically from their perception as passive and
distant figures to actors who take an active part in the management of
the proceedings.92 Such procedural activism found expression in the
exercise of new authority in the preliminary stages of trial and in
judges' attempts to render the process more efficient, both by promoting
settlement and in their interpretation of the various procedural rules.9"
Critics of managerial judging claim that such activism bars the
parties from raising substantive claims and shelters judges from
supervision and intervention.94 Despite critiques, these practices have
become widespread and are an inherent part of the contemporary
judicial landscape, extending beyond pre-trial to the trial itself.9"
In recent years, managerial judging techniques have been absorbed
into the broader category of 'judicial dispute resolution,"96 or 'judicial
conflict resolution. 9 7 Under this novel understanding of the judicial
role, judges are expected to perform a myriad of dispute resolution
functions, including judicial negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
problem solving, dialogue-facilitation, restorative justice, and dispute
system design.98 While these roles occupy most of what judges do in
practice, they have yet to be studied and conceptualized.

91. Resnik, supra note 87, at 378.
92. See id. at 381-86 (recounting the historical role ofjudges but noting that now
'judges who passively await parties' pretrial request are out of step with colleagues who
have implemented [ADR] ...procedures").
93. See id. at 385.
94. E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudgingand the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 314-18 (1986); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The ManagerialJudge Goes to
Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (2010).
95. Elliott, supra note 94, at 314; Thornburg, supra note 94, at 1263.
96. TANIA SOURDIN & ARCHIE ZARISKI, THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE
JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2013) (defining judicial dispute resolution as the
process ofjudges encouraging and actively engaging in settlement negotiations).
97. Alberstein, supra note 87, at 881 (defining judicial conflict resolution as a
combination ofjudicial authority and consensual processes).
98. Id.
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The changes described in the judicial role have heightened
concerns over inconsistent application of rules across cases, judicial
neutrality, reasoned decision-making, documentation, and the
availability of effective monitoring by appellate courts.99
These
concerns echo some of the worries raised over the adoption of ADR
and their impact on access to justice, explored above. Indeed, the
adoption of ADR in courts has led to the erosion of the formalinformal distinction, and much of what transpires in courts has
1
become "semi-formal,""
' with efficiency being the primary driving
force for settlement-encouragement and the adoption of expedited
flexible procedures, both within and outside the litigation route."'
Similarly, the initial impetus for the adoption of technology in both
formal and informal dispute resolution was to enhance efficiency,
2
much in the same direction previous procedural reforms have taken. 1
Nevertheless, the impact of digital technology on the efficiencyfairness trade-off has taken a different direction, creating new
opportunities for enhancing access to justice through court ODR in
what we refer to as the "new new courts."
II.

ACCESS TOJUSTICE,

ODR, AND THE NEW

NEW COURT

In this Part we describe the impact digital technology has had on the
court system in terms of access tojustice. While the institution of ADR
in courts gave rise to the new courts, the incorporation of ODR into
court proceedings is giving rise to the new new courts. The qualities
of digital technology-mainly the use of algorithms and the availability
of Big Data-are re-shaping court proceedings in a direction that
could mitigate the efficiency-fairness trade-off that has colored the
debate over the new courts, and enhance access tojustice. At the same
time, it is precisely the reliance on algorithms and the use of Big Data that
create new challenges to the fairness and integrity of the justice system.

99. Thornburg, supra note 94, passim.
100. Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Fornal, supra note 21, at 425 (explaining that "semiformal" implies a hybrid or mixture of processes).
101. Id. at 430.
102. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of Courts
Through Technology, 12 UCLAJ.L. & TECH. 1, 4-5 (2008); Yamamoto, supra note 53, at
1056-57 (explaining that increased use of ADRwasjust one reform by which to make
courts more efficient).
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A.

Sources of the New New Court

Courts are conservative entities that are resistant to change. In part,
such resistance is due to their role as a body whose mandate is to
regulate the pace of change in society and, in that respect, have always
been slow to change. 103 The introduction of digital technology into
the courtroom and the prospects of adopting ODR in courts present
an additional layer of challenges to courts' operations. Much of what
we have associated with the functioning of courts-legal documents,
control over specialized knowledge, and precedent-is a product of
the print-era. 104 The qualities of digital communication and the spread
of internet communication are undermining some of the most
entrenched practices associated with courts, as well as the authority of
lawyers and judges. 10°
Despite its commitment to stability, the law has undergone
significant change in recent decades, much of which is attributable to
the impact of digital technology. While paper is still in use, courts and
law firms are now computerized, online filing is widespread, lawyers
rely on online databases for legal research, email is a common means
of communication between lawyers and clients, and the courtroom
allows for the display of digital evidence, videos, and the like.106 While
these changes are significant, it is important to recognize that they
were aimed at improving efficiency and dealing with budgetary

103. M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW
5-6(1989).
104. See id. at 17-48 (discussing how technology is reshaping the legal field and
challenging long-standing values such as concern with the past).
105. See id. at 198-226 (arguing that the increased access to legal information
undermines some of the power that lawyer and courts traditionally held); RICHARD
SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: How TECHNOLOGYWILL
TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 68 (2015) (asserting that technology is
transforming the legal profession and changing the ways in which lawyers work). Of
course, there are additional factors aside from digital technology that are contributing
to the erosion of the authority of professionals, as the authors of this book eloquently
explain.
106. See CHIEFJUSTICEJOHN G. ROBERTSJR., 2014YEAR-END REPORT ON THEJUDICIARY
4-5
(2014),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2014yearendreport.pdf (noting that courts implement technologies that "advance their
primary goal of fairly and efficiently adjudicating cases through the application of
law"); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FISCALYEAR 2017 UPDATE: LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR

INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY

IN

THE

FEDERAL

JUDICIARY

2-4

(2016),

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-it-long-range-plan-0.pdf
(reporting the technological advances of the federal courts, including individual court
websites and e-filing and planned future upgrades).
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constraints, rather than re-imagining the litigation process and the
role of courts. 0 7 Under such a view, technology is only a means that
allows courts to process more cases in less time and at lower costs, a
rather narrow understanding of the ways in which digital technology
could enhance access to justice. As we explain below, this view has
evolved over time. The adoption of technology in courts has gone
through several phases, reflecting changes in both the level of
sophistication of available technology and the societal views and
preferences towards the use of digital technology.
Initially, technology came into the courtroom as part of an internalbureaucratic
evolution in work practices, much like the
computerization of other workplaces and offices outside the legal
realm."' 8 Later, as online filing was introduced, court decisions were
being published online, and court websites became an important
source of information. Ultimately, lawyers and their clients came to
see digital technology as an integral part of the legal landscape.0 9
While court websites have existed for some time, the approach
towards their configuration has changed. In the past, they were seen
primarily as a vehicle for conveying large amounts of general
information; for example, court websites could cover court
procedures, the law, rights and remedies, defenses, and the availability
of legal aid. 1 While the online display of such information increased
its accessibility, such improvement proved mild.1 The distribution of
large quantities of unspecific information that was not tailored to the
specifics of a particular case was insufficient in easing the difficulties
107. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE
84-91 (2013) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS] (discussing the
impediments to judicial access in the United Kingdom and how the technological
advances are not making access much easier).
108. Also referred to as "e-working." See id. at 94-95; Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond
Efficiency, supra note 102, at 34-35.
109. See Patrick Carlson, The Must-Have Legal Technology to Start a Law Fin in 2016,
LAwTECH. TODAY (Apr. 7,2016), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2016/04/legaltechnology-2016 (proclaiming that technology enables law firms to connect more
personally with potential clients and take advantage of a more tech-savvy society).
110. See,
e.g.,
Small
Claims
Court
Procedures,
VA.'S
JUD.
SYS.,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/resources/smallclaimscourt-procedures.pdf
(outlining the process for bringing a claim); see also Donald F. Norris & Christopher
G. Reddick, Local E-Government in the United States: Transformation or Incremental
Change?, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 165, 165 (2013) (examining the trajectory of court
internet presence and comparing it to early projections of how such presence would
unfold).
111. Id.
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parties faced in their particular cases; it was especially difficult for pro
112
se disputants to navigate their way through the system.
As technology advanced, court websites, legal aid websites, and
software shifted from information provision to information processing
to allow platforms to provide parties with tailored legal information
that could guide them in handling their individual cases."' Various
courts and legal aid bodies re-designed their sites, incorporating such
tools as interactive questionnaires, podcasts, and videos. 4 Legal aid
organizations have also used a variety of software tools, such as "remote
assistance," to help self-represented parties. 1
For example, A2J
Author, designed by the Chicago-Kent College of Law, and the
Interactive Community Assistance Network (I-CAN!), developed by the
nonprofit Legal Aid Society of Orange County in partnership with the
Superior Court of California in Orange County, are both examples of
impressive legal-aid driven tools. 6 Both programs use interactive
software that extracts information from the parties to refer them to
11 7
relevant, individualized, and instructive legal information.
In some instances, we are beginning to see ODR introduced into the
remote assistance landscape. ODR mechanisms first surfaced as online
substitutes for ADR processes-such as negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration-in those cases in which courts and ADR were unavailable,
too costly, or ineffective. 1
Over time, more and more dispute types
became candidates for ODR and the assumption that parties should
address their disputes face-to-face was relaxed. 9

112. James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV.J.L.
& TECH. 241, 256 (2012).
113. Id. at 248.
114. Id. at 247-48.
115. See id. at 249 (noting that "remote assistance" services include instant
messaging programs or other live chatting services, which connect self-represented
individuals with trained specialists).
116. See Ronald W. Staudt,All the Wild Possibilities: Technology that Attacks Barriers to
Access to Justice,42 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1117, 1129-30 (2009) (discussing the origins of A2J
Author); Interactive Community Assistance Network (I-CAN!), SUPERIOR CT. OF ORANGE
COUNTY 1, http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/KlepsBriefICAN.pdf (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017) (explaining that I-CAN! was developed to help self-represented litigants
file court documents).
117. See Staudt, supra note 116, at 1123 (providing an overview of the function of
the Legal Service Corporation's Technology Initiative Grants program).
118. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute
Systems Design, 17 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 151, 169-77 (2012) (providing examples of
early adopters of ODR including eBay and SquareTrade).
119. Id. at 182.
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This change was largely a result of developing internet
communications, with the shift from personal computers to cell
phones and the growth of social networks.1 20 Consequently, online
communication could take place between friends, acquaintances, or
strangers,
regardless
of physical
distance.
With
online
communications becoming an adequate substitute for offline
communications and the incorporation of digital technology in the
courts as described above, it is unsurprising that ODR processes are
being employed by courts and replacing traditional face-to-face court
proceedings in certain contexts.
While the adoption of ODR processes may seem like an extension of
existing court operations, merely improving courts' convenience and
accessibility, it is our contention that the adoption of full-fledged ODR
systems could transform courts as we know them. Courts will shift from
institutions that rely on physical presence and geography; employ
human decision-making; and resolve individual cases as a channel for
enforcing and developing the law, to ones that increasingly rely on
digital communication, employ algorithms, and prevent disputes from
arising as a means of enforcing existing norms and establishing the
need for new law.
These shifts have the potential to overcome the efficiency-fairness
trade-off that colored the institutionalization of ADR and the emergence
of the new court and, therefore, could enhance access to justice
dramatically. The above shifts also present new challenges and dangers
that could jeopardize the just resolution and prevention of disputes.
This Section will explore some of the new new courts that are already
operating or are in the making as a first step in considering their impact
on access to justice as compared to the new courts. Further, this Section
surveys early ODR initiatives that have led to the current ODR systems.

B.

New New Courts in Action

Courts introduced early ODR initiatives over a decade ago and
focused mainly on the added efficiencies associated with processing a
case online. 121 The initiatives targeted simple, low-value disputes or
disputes in which geographical distance has made the prospect of

120. SeeCharlesArthur, How the SmaritphonelsKilling the PC,GUARDIAN (June 5,2011,
3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jun/05/smartphoneskilling-pc.
121. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public: DiminishingPrivacy in DisputeResolution
in the Internet Age, 7 VA.J.L. & TECH. 4, 35 (2002).
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online interaction appealing. Because ODR processes take place
exclusively online, asynchronously, and typically without legal
representation, they reduce legal costs and the length of proceedings
as compared to in-court proceedings.12 2
There are several examples of what could be viewed as a firstgeneration court ODR, the adoption of online processes for discrete,
simple disputes that rely on online written communications with very
little data processing and algorithmic intervention. One example is
the Australian eCourtroom launched in February 2001, which allowed
for online document and evidence submission, email exchanges, and
court orders. 121 Online courts reduced the need for face-to-face
hearings, as well as the length of those hearings conducted,1 24 allowing
the court to deal more effectively with complex, document-heavy cases
and with cases in which parties were located at a distance. 5
Another example is "Money Claim Online," a process related to
monetary claims, which has been an available tool in the United
Kingdom for over a decade.1 26 Parties can execute their claims entirely
online, unless the defendant files a counterclaim in which case the
claim is resolved through traditional means. 27 This process is widely
12
used and has been successful. 1
The online process in both examples merely substitutes for the faceto-face appearances in court without changing the nature of the

122. The efficiencies associated with ADR, described earlier in this Article, are even
more pronounced in ODR proceedings because of this increased flexibility. See id. at
30-32 (discussing the advantages of ODR over traditional types of mediation); see also
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
123. See Online Services: eCourtroom, FED. CT. AUSTL., http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/
online-services/ ecourtroom (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
124. SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS, supra note 107, at 107. The eCourtroom is
used to address various types of disputes, including native title claims.
125. Brian Tamberlin, Online Dispute Resolution and the Courts, THIRD ANN. UN F.
ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 387 (July 2004). Some Singapore courts also offer an email-based
online mediation process ("e-Alternative Dispute Resolution") that is used specifically
for e-commerce-related disputes wherein court action has not yet been initiated.
Nicolas W. Vermeys & Karim Benyekhlef, ODR and the Courts, in ONLINE DISPUTE
THEORY AND PRACTICE:
A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 295, 304 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al. eds., 2012).
RESOLUTION:

126. See Vermeys & Benyekhlef, supra note 125, at 302-03 ("Money Claim Online
allows claimants and defendants to use online forms to settle a money claim rather
than incurring the costs associated with a court case.").
127. Id. at 303.
128. Id.; see also SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'SLAWYERS, supra note 107, at 102 (noting that
Money Claim Online handles roughly 60,000 claims a year).
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process conducted or the values and goals promoted through such a
process. In some of the more advanced, recently launched ODR
programs, the role of technology is understood more richly by
embracing the unique qualities of digital technology, the use of
algorithms and data to re-design court processes, thereby offering a
novel vision of the justice system.
1.

The Civil Resolution Tribunal
British Columbia is the first jurisdiction to have an operational
online tribunal. The tribunal, called the Civil Resolution Tribunal
(CRT), was established under law and has been in operation since July
2016.129 The CRT currently handles civil monetary claims of up to
Can$5,000 and certain "strata," or neighbor-related, claims.3 0 Strata
disputes have been processed by the CRT since its launch, and the
small claims, up to Can$5,000, sinceJune 2017.131
The CRT went through extensive planning, development, and
testing stages before being launched last year, requiring not only
technical know-how and software adjustments, but also provoking
political challenges because of the CRT's mandate. The CRT was
adopted as a mandatory, lawyer-free (with some exceptions) system for
all claims falling under the tribunal's jurisdiction.1 3 2 It is available
24/7, accessible via computer or smartphone for a low fee, and1 3is3
approach.
non-adversarial
collaborative,
a
on
premised
Furthermore, the entire process is quick, on average lasting sixty to
ninety days.1 3 4 Lawyers and professional associations perceived this
new scheme as a significant challenge, so additional consultations with
3
relevant constituencies were necessary prior to CRT's launch.l1
CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.; Small Claims Under $5000 Coming to the CRT on June 1, 2017, CIV. RESOL.
TRIBUNAL (Apr. 18, 2017), https://civilresolutionbc.ca/small-claims-5000-coming-crtjune-1-2017.
132. Interview with Darin Thompson, B.C. Ministry of Justice, & Shannon Salter,
Chair of the Civil Resolution Tribunal (Sept. 10, 2015) (on file with authors).
133. Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, B.C. GOV'T http://www.gov.bc.ca/gov/
content /justice /about-bcs-justice-system /legislation-policy/legislation-updates /civilresolution-tribunal-act (last visited on Oct. 23, 2017).
134. See Lasia Ketzel, CRTReveals New Tool to Resolve Strata and Small Claims Disputes,
NEWS 1130 (July 15, 2016, 3:19 PM), http://www.newsll30.com/2016/07/15/tool-toresolve-strata-small-distputes (describing the CRT as new tool to make dispute
resolution easier).
135. SeeJean Sorensen, B.C. Lawyers WorriedAbout Exclusionfrom New Civil Resolution
Tribunal, CANADIAN LAw. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/
129.
130.
131.
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The system itself is comprised of four main stages. The first involves
"information, problem diagnosis, and self-help."1"6 This stage allows
the parties to anonymously explore their options and have a better
understanding of their legal case-its merit, its strengths and
weaknesses, and available courses of action. To that end, the parties
use the "Solution Explorer," a user-friendly stage that provides tailored
legal information, based on the user's answers to interactive questions,
on whether they have a valid claim and what legal route they can
13 7
pursue in addition to tools, template letters, and other resources.
If parties decide to pursue their claim, then the claim is seamlessly
transferred to the CRT and the parties can proceed to the second stage
of "party-to-party negotiation," which is an automated negotiation
through ODR process. 3 8 In this stage, the software presents the parties
with pre-structured language describing their problem and
highlighting possible solutions.3 9
The negotiation phase is a relatively brief one and if it does not result
in an agreement, the parties are directed to a third "case management"
stage, which involves third party online facilitation, and opens several
options. 40 Parties can have a synchronous facilitation in which the
third party's assistance is rendered in real time or they can
communicate asynchronously. 4 1 The facilitator is not limited to a
purely facilitative role and may provide parties with an evaluation of
their legal case in an attempt to bring the parties closer together
1 42
through online interaction or help them prepare for a hearing.
Most claims will be resolved at this stage, but those that are not will
continue to the fourth and final stage, referred to as adjudication. 43

legalfeeds/author/mallory-h endry/bc-lawyers-worried-about-exclusion-from-newcivil-resolution-tribunal-5311 (noting the concern amongst lawyers about whether an
individual's rights will be adequately represented by the CRT).
136. Ashton Butler, BC's Civil Resolution Tribunal: A CaseforExpandingOnlineDispute
Resolution in Canada,SASKATCHEWAN L. REv. (May 31, 2017), http://sasklawreview.ca/
comment/bcs-civi-resolution-tribunal-a-case-for-expanding-online-dispute-resolutionin-canada.php.
137. Id.; Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
138. Butler, supra note 136.
139. Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
140. See Butler, supra note 136 (highlighting the flexibility of the case management
stage).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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During adjudication, the hearing may take place via written
submissions, telephone, or video conferencing.1 44 The CRT platform
provides the parties with a reasoned written decision, which is
enforceable as a court order and is subject to a bifurcated appeal
process: small claims orders are subject to an appeal de novo, and
strata claims can be appealed only on limited grounds.14
Since its launch, the CRT has handled over 7500 strata claims."
They are committed to ongoing learning and improvement. The CRT
team constantly seeks feedback from both satisfied and unsatisfied
users to improve the process, identify problems, and replicate
successful elements. 4 7 They collect data in a myriad of ways available
only because of the CRT's online nature: active user input given
through rating and ranking, open text boxes, ex-post feedback, and
analysis of dispute resolution data. 4 ' Indeed, CRT developers have
devoted significant efforts and resources to the development and
refinement of categorizations of claims and defenses in order to allow
for meaningful use of the data. Such data helps to improve the CRT
and the diagnosis phase, and, perhaps more importantly, helps
prevent future claims. 49
As the CRT team has recognized, learning from data and prevention
of problems need not be limited to the improvement of the system
itself, but could be viewed as a broader goal of the legal system. 150 As
use of online systems expands and data is stored and studied more
extensively by courts, they will be able to detect, through such
indicators as spikes in particular claims, that there is a regulatory gap
or a need for better enforcement of existing laws in certain areas. aT In
this way, dispute resolution data collected in courts can be used to
prevent future disputes from occurring.

144. Id.
145. Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
146. Tanja Rostek, Happy FirstBirthday, StrataSolution Explorer.!, Civ. RESOL. TRIBUNAL
(June 30, 2017), https://civilresolutionbc.ca/happy-first-birthday-strata-solutionexplorer.
147. See id. ("Every organization says 'We Value Your Feedback.' But at the CRT,
we not only value your feedback, we encourage it.").
148. Id.; Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
149. Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
150. Id.
151. See ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITA JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGYAND
THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES 167 (2017) [hereinafter KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL
JUSTICE] (explaining how the identification of such patterns can generate better rules
and/or more effective enforcement and thereby prevent future claims from arising).
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2.

Rechtwijzer
The Hague Institute for the Internalization of Law ("HiiL") and
Modria (the leading designer of ODR services) developed Rechtwijzer
as an ODR platform to specifically address divorce and neighbor
disputes. 112 It was launched in 2014, but its operation was recently
discontinued due to a lack of financial viability, low usage, and
difficulties in collaborating with the justice system.1"
This discontinuance was a major disappointment for supporters of
ODR, as the Rechtwijzer platform won high acclaim in wide circles and
its demise came as a great surprise to many at a time when court ODR
seemed to be on the rise." 4 A new venture called Justice42, however,
which draws on the Rechtwijzer platform and its lessons, is expected to
launch in collaboration with a Dutch IT firm, and will hopefully benefit
from referrals by Dutch legal aid-although Dutch legal aid will not be
involved as a partner."
The Rechtwijzer system was offered as a voluntary service to
divorcing couples who were seeking a collaborative and amicable
avenue for the dissolution of their marriage."a6 Like some of the other
ODR processes it was also based on an initial diagnosis phase and
7
intake for each of the parties.1
Following these preliminary stages, the parties conducted a direct
online negotiation process on the relevant topics that arose in their
separation, such as custody and visitation, housing arrangement,
property division, alimony, and future communication.l1s
Negotiation on the platform is interest-based, but also ensures
parties' rights are protected by providing relevant legal information,
such as providing alimony calculation tools that are compliant with

152. Rechtwijzer"
Divorce
and
Separation,
HILL,
http://www.hiil.org/project/rechtwijzer-divorce-separation-netherlands
(last visited
Oct. 23, 2017).
153. See Maurits Barendrecht, Rechtwijzer" Why Online SupportedDispute Resolution Is
Hard to Implement, HilL (June 21, 2017), http:/ /www.hiil.org/insight/rechtwijzer-whyonline-supporte-dispute-resolution-is-hard-to-implement;
Roger
Smith,
Goodbye
Rechtwijzer" Hello, Justice42, LAw, TECH.& ACCESS TOJUST. (Mar. 31, 2017), https: //lawtech-a2j.org/advice/goodbye-rechtwijzer-hello-justice42 (noting that these endeavors
are too expensive for governments to fund and that developing a "mutually reinforcing
partnership" with traditionaljustice systems to expand the digital platform is difficult).
154. Barendrecht, supra note 153.
155. Smith, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Barendrecht, supra note 153.
158. Id.
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legal rules and a neutral lawyer to evaluate any agreement reached by
the parties during the negotiation process.1 9 Interestingly, Rechtwijzer is
able to realize what has been a rather elusive goal in traditional dispute
resolution: devising non-adversarial interest-based agreements while
balancing power between the parties.
HiiL and Modria charged the Dutch legal aid board a setup fee and a feeper-user, and users were charged a fixed modest fee, subsidized for those
eligible for legal aid.16 ° Rechtwijzer presented significant savings in

comparison with legal costs in a court proceeding, received high ratings from
users, and was associated with low stress levels during divorce proceedings.161
Unfortunately, as stated above, Rechtwijzer's activity was recently halted,
despite positive feedback and high satisfaction rates by users. It remains to
be seen whether the new product, Justice42, will be able to offer a viable

alternative to the adversarial and costly court divorce proceedings.
3.

The Online Solutions Court
In July 2016, Lord Justice Briggs, then of the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales, now of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, published the Civil Courts Structure Review, proposing the
institution of an "Online Solutions Court" for monetary claims of up
to £25,000, rolling out in phases with an initial cap of £10,000.162 The
Briggs Report was preceded by another important report authored by
Professor Richard Susskind and the Civil Justice Council in which the
contours of such an online court, then called "Her Majesty's Online
Court," were drawn and the seeds for its adoption were planted.16 The
establishment of the court is part of a more sweeping £730 million
reform of the entire court system and is scheduled to be launched in
full by April 2020.164

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. (hypothesizing that the low stress levels may have been due to a user's
ability to spread out utilization hours thereby allowing a user to work at their own
pace).
162. LORD JUSTICE BRiGs, JUDICIARY OF ENG. & WALES, CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE
REVIEW:
FINAL REPORT 118-20 (2016) [hereinafter BRIGGS, ANNUAL REPORT],

https://wwwjudiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structurereview-final-report-jul-16-final-i.pdf.
163. CIV. JUST. COUNCIL, ONLINE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION FOR Low VALUE CIVIL CLAIMS:

ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP 3 (2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/

wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Versionl .pdf.
164. BRIGGS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162, at 46, 115-16; Final Report in Lord
JusticeBfiggs Civil Courts StructureReview, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS: LITIG. NOTES (Aug.
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The Online Solutions Court is meant to enhance access to justice by
providing a less adversarial and more investigative court process that is
more easily "navigable" for parties.16
The Online Solutions Court
departs from the traditional court model in three important respects:
(1) it will be conducted online; (2) it will incorporate ADR; and (3) it
will be used by the parties themselves.16 6
The process envisaged will be comprised of three stages. First, there
will be an exploratory stage in which parties will seek algorithmic
tailored assistance, informing them whether they have a valid legal
claim and, if so, what routes are available to them, as well as allowing
them to submit a claim form.16 7 Tailored answers are given based on
responses provided by parties to the questions presented to them in
plain language.
The system will also provide information on
alternative avenues and options outside of court, such as an
ombudsman scheme. 68 This stage was described both as being the
most important, because it will allow parties to solve their problem at
an early stage, and also as the stage that often presents the hardest
design challenge. 69 Sophisticated or represented parties will be able
to bypass this stage.170
The second stage involves case management and conciliation by case
officers, a new position created in the court system. 171 Conciliation
efforts could include such means as ODR, telephone communications,
72
face-to-face mediation, or early neutral evaluation.1
The last, and third, stage involves legal determination, which could
be conducted in a conventional hearing or, alternatively, on paper, via

4, 2016, 12:06 PM), http://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2016/08/04/final-report-in-lordjustice-briggss-civil-courts-structure-review; see Pablo Cort6s & Rafal Mafiko,
Developments in European Civil Procedures, in THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 41, 59 (Pablo Cort6s ed., 2016).
165. See BRIGGS, ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 162, at 45 (noting that the online court
aims to make the dispute resolution process more navigable and reduce the assistance
from lawyers).
166. SIR TERENCE ETHERTONJUDICIARY OF ENG. & WHALES, THE CIVIL COURT OF THE

FUTURE 6 (2017), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/slynnlecture-mr-civil-court-of-the-future-20170615.pdf.
167. See BRIGGS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162, at 58-59.
168. See ETHERTON, supra note 166, at 8-9 (explaining that the system will help
individuals pursue legal and non-legal claims).
169. See BRIGGS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162, at 50 (noting that the first stage is,
in part, difficult to design because it cannot replace lawyers' advice on the merits).
170. Id. at 59.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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video, or through the telephone.1 7' These decisions are subject to an
174
appeal.
Lord Justice Briggs recommends that at some point the Online
Solutions Court become mandatory, and assistance to those who find
digital media inaccessible should be aided in an effective way, rather
17
than preventing the system as a whole from moving online. 5
The focus of much of the Briggs Report is making the English court
system more accessible for low value claims. Therefore, the online
court envisaged in the report is meant to be used mainly by nonlawyers. As a result, the design of the process needs to be sufficiently
simple, making it necessary to devise novel procedural rules for the
online court and bringing about a deeper cultural change.1 76 The
redesign means that rather than merely fitting the existing civil
procedure rules to the online context, new simple procedures should
be designed for the online court.
At the same time, the Online Solutions Court is not meant to
exclude lawyers because they are perceived as having an important role
in assisting in the resolution of legal disputes.1 77 Therefore, a delicate
balance needs to be maintained in the recoverability of legal costs to
allow for the hiring of lawyers on the one hand, but also not to deter
pro se litigants from bringing claims themselves because they fear
178
incurring high costs.
While the Briggs Report faced significant critiques, such as
preventing access from those "challenged by computers," 179 providing
"second class justice,"' 0 and "excluding lawyers," ' the pilot is moving
full steam ahead with a team working away on the new procedural rules
as well as the development of the pilot.

173. Id. at 38.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 39-40 (encouraging the system to be available on tables and
smartphones, notjust laptops and desktops, to increase accessibility).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 41 ("It is not a design objective of the Online Court to exclude lawyers.
The underlying rationale is that whereas the traditional courts are only truly accessible
by, and intelligible to, lawyers, the new court should as far as possible be equally
accessible to lawyers and [litigants].").
178. Id. at 41.
179. Id. at 38-41.
180. Id. at 37-38.
181. Id. at 41-44.
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4.

Matterhorn
Matterhorn was developed in 2013 by Michigan Law Professor JJ.
Prescott and his former student.18 2 Since then, Matterhorn has been
used to launch online court processes into a few dozen U.S. state courts
in Michigan, Ohio, and Arkansas. 8 3
The system handles mostly
outstanding warrants and traffic violations, and it has been expanded
to cover such areas as small claims and family disputes. 8 4
Matterhorn allows individuals involved in court proceedings to
communicate online withjudges, prosecutors, city attorneys, and other
officials involved in the process."' The specifics of the process may
vary depending on the type of case (outstanding warrant, traffic
violations, etc.) and the characteristics of the party involved (e.g.,
being a minor)."6 If the cases meet certain eligibility criteria-such as
the nature of case and the litigant's history-and choose to use
Matterhorn, the online platform allows those who are sued or receive
a ticket or notice of violation to submit a request for relief or a request
to negotiate with a city attorney, prosecutor, or other decision
maker. 8 7
Once they open a communication channel through
Matterhorn, the individuals must answer questions and submit a
statement.188 In the case of civil infractions, if a recommendation is
made by the city attorney or prosecutor, it is then reviewed by a
judge. 8 9 If a settlement offer is made, it is communicated to the
litigant through the platform. 90 If the case regards an outstanding
warrant, then the litigant petitions the judge, again answering
questions and a statement as well as a request either to appear before
the court or to devise a payment plan. 91 If a litigant fails to comply
182. See Persky, supra note 6 (explaining that the system was born out of a desire to
help reduce the backlog of outstanding warrants in court systems).
183. Email fromJJ. Prescott, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to Orna RabinovichEiny, Author (July 18, 2017, 6:37 PM) (on file with authors).
184. J.J. Prescott, Assessing-Access to Justice Outreach Strategies (manuscript at 6) (draft
on file with authors).
185. How It Works, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/how-matterhornworks (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).

186. Id.
187. JJ.

Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology
(manuscript at 21 n.157) (draft on file with authors) [hereinafter Prescott, Improving

Access].
188. Id. (manuscript at 21).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See
Online
Dispute
Resolution
for
Courts,
MATTERHORN,
https://getmatterhorn.com/online-dispute-resolution-for-courts (last visited Oct. 23,
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with a court decision or declines an offer, the original charge is
reinstated and the litigant is notified. 92
In these cases, the ability to process the case from afar reduces not
only the difficulties associated with having to travel to a court and to
devote time to the proceedings, but it also lessens the fear of appearing
in court, especially for those disputants who are worried about the
consequences of an outstanding warrant or debt. 9 '
Courts that have implemented Matterhorn collect and analyze data
with great tenacity, evaluating such measures as cost savings, time frames,
and impact on access to justice. 94 In addition, studies have measured
95
litigant perceptions of fairness and emotions towards online platforms.
The data gathered and analyzed indicate that the availability of online
proceedings where Matterhorn was used has been an important factor in
improving access to justice, both by encouraging more parties to bring
their case and by reducing the average processing time of all cases in
courts employing Matterhorn. In these courts, Matterhorn cases and
traditional cases were resolved in substantially less time. 96 Research
on litigant perceptions regarding the fairness of online proceedings in
courts using Matterhorn has underscored the significance of procedural
justice in this context and has generated important insights for the
design of online courts. Such issues include the need for interpersonal
cues from court officials or more interactive communication avenues
9I 7
to enhance perceptions of fairness in these proceedings.
Matterhorn's commitment to enhancing access to justice and its
rigorous evaluation of efficiency and fairness in court proceedings
have made it a highly successful venture. It has experienced significant
growth, spreading to a large number of courts in several states, as well
as expanding to cover a wider variety of legal claims.

2017) (noting that the system has a configurable payment assessment feature that
helps courts decide between payment plans and alternative penalties).
192. Prescott, ImprovingAccess, supra note 187 (manuscript at 21).
193.
OnlineDispute Resolutionfor Courts, supra note 191.
194. Lorelei Laird, J.J. Prescott: Go to Court Without Leaving Home, ABAJ. (Sept. 7,
2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/jj-prescott profile.
195. SeeYouyang Hou et al., Factors in Fairnessand Emotion in Online Case Resolution
Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2511, 2511 (2017) (examining survey responses regarding
attitudes toward ODR).
196. See id.; Laird, supranote 194 (noting that the software has cut case closure rates
for courts employing Matterhorn from thirty to sixty days on average to 7.67 days).
197. SeeYouyang Hou et al., supra note 195, at 2511.
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5.

The New York ODR debt collection pilot
The permanent Commission on Access to Justice operating under
the New York State Unified Court System revealed a stunningly high
default rate in debt collection cases (between eighty to ninety percent).
Reacting to this rate, the Commission sought to urgently address the
access to justice deficit in this context.19 Consequently, together with
the ABA Judicial Division, New York State is developing a proposed
pilot of court-annexed ODR for debt collection cases.199
Given the low rate of debtor participation and the power imbalance
between debtors and creditors, the entire ODR process was designed
with consumer protection in mind. 00 Options and text are carefully
chosen so as to ensure that consumers do not waive their rights.01
Also, once parties choose to use the system, communication between
the alleged debtor and creditor must be conducted solely through the
platform. 20 2 Despite the fact that the current system works to the
benefit of creditors, the online system is expected to appeal to
creditors because it is more likely to produce agreements that will be
respected and executed by consumers-as opposed to default court
judgments.0 3 Indeed, several creditors have already indicated interest
in participating in the pilot once it is launched.0 4
The proposed ODR scheme is designed as a voluntary tiered
system.20 a In this system, the first stage would be a solutions explorer,
which was designed as part of the CRT in British Columbia. 20 6 An
important consumer protection feature of the proposed system is that
it is designed to identify whether the debtor has an absolute defense.0 7
If such a defense exists, then the system will not allow the debtor to
continue to the direct negotiation stage. 20 ' The system therefore sets
out to balance the power between the consumer and creditor and to
ensure that consumers' rights are respected.

198. Telephone Interview with David Larson, Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline
Sch. of Law (July 25, 2017).
199. Id.; New York OnlineDispute Resolution, supra note 7.
200. See Telephone Interview with David Larson, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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In the second stage, if the debtor does not have an absolute defense,
then the parties can conduct an online negotiation.0 9 Concern over
power imbalances have influenced the proposed design, limiting
parties' choice of language and offering them pre-structured
communication options through drop down menus which feature
prescribed language and options.210
If direct efforts through negotiation fail, or if the consumers so
desire at any earlier stage, they may connect to legal services or request
a third-party mediator.2 11 At this point it is undecided whether this
proposed third stage will be conducted via text or video. 1 2
The conceptual design of the ODR system was completed and
submitted to the court in late June 2017.1 It is anticipated that the
request for proposals will be published soon.21 4' Then providers will be
able to submit bids for the execution of the pilot. The system may
undergo some modifications depending upon the selected vendor's
proposal, but the general commitment to the design of a balanced
system that incorporates consumer protection will be preserved.2l
Even in these early phases, the project is already facing significant
hurdles. For one, the New York court system is not fully digitized, thus
creating challenges for successful implementation of ODR. 1 6 Indeed,
as we can see from the description of the Tyler-Modria merger
below, 21 7 ODR and court-digitization projects go hand in hand and can
complement one another.
Another challenge, perhaps more difficult, involves the objection by
legal service providers that are concerned that the ODR system would
benefit creditors at the expense of debtors.1 8 While these concerns are
valid, the alternative of providing legal support for the vast majority of
debtors is unrealistic. 219' For that reason, the team in charge of the design
of the project believes that by devising an accessible, easy-to-use online
system, which empowers consumers and protects their rights, the
system will provide consumers, who currently are not engaging with the
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section II.B.6.
Telephone Interview with David Larson, supra note 198.
Id.
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justice system, with much needed support and assistance.
The
proposed system is not intended to replace legal services but instead will
provide an additional route by which consumers can gain access tojustice.221

6.

Tyler Technologies-Modriaacquisition

One of the most interesting developments in court ODR is the
acquisition of Modria by Tyler Technologies in May 2017.222 Modria is
the leading software platform for the design and operation of online
dispute resolution services. It was established by Colin Rule and Chittu
Nagarajan in 2011, after the two left their positions at eBay and
Paypal. 22' Rule and Nagarajan developed the eBay-Paypal ODR system,
which handled over 60 million disputes a year, the vast majority of
which were resolved through automated dispute resolution services.224
While Modria has had substantial experience in the e-commerce
sector designing ODR systems for platforms such as Upwork and
Rover, it has also been a central player in the public sector in designing
ODR systems for family divorce cases via the Rechtwijzer platform,22a
property tax appeals in the United States and Canada, and no-fault
arbitration cases (the AAA New York No Fault Insurance ADR Center).226
Tyler Technologies is the largest software company operating in the
United States in the local government sector.227 It was founded in 1966
and since 1997 has focused on providing software-based solutions for
local government. 22 Tyler Technologies services over 15,000 local

220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
See Scott Carr & Colin Rule, ModfiaJoins Forces with Tyler Technologies, MODRIA

(May 30, 2017) http://www.b2i.us/profiles/investor/ResLibraryView.asp?
BzID 499&ResLibrarylD 83554&Category 16 (noting that Tyler Technologies is the
largest company in the world that focuses exclusively on local government
technologies).
223. Telephone Interview with Colin Rule, Co-Founder, Modria (July 25, 2017) (on
file with authors).
224. AmyJ. Schmitz, Consumer Redress in the United States, in THE NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 324, 338 (Cortes ed., 2016); see KATSH
& RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITALJUSTICE, supra note 151, at 4, 34-35 (describing the shift
towards automated resolution based on the sheer volume of disputes).
225. See supra Section II.B.2.
226. Robert Ambrogi, Is There a Future for Online Dispute Resolution for Lawyers?,
LAwSITES BLOG (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2016/04/futureonline-dispute-resolution.html; Telephone Interview with Colin Rule, supra note 223.
227. See Histoiy of Tyler Technologies, TYLER TECHNOLOGIES (last visited on Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.tylertech.com/about-us/corporate-history.
228. Id.
BLOG
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government offices, including courts and school districts. 229 Nine
hundred counties across the United States have incorporated Tyler
Technologies's court management and online filing system.
The acquisition of Modria by Tyler Technologies allows Tyler to
incorporate Modria into its software and offer its clients an additional
layer of options to manage court cases and increase the odds of
efficient resolution.2 1 Tyler Technologies has an impressive court
diagnosis tool, 2 2 which plugs into its e-filing tool.23
By integrating
ODR into these tools, the court creates a one-stop shop for intake and
diagnosis, enhancing case resolution and closure. 4
The platform will be implemented across a range of case types,
including family, workplace, and debt, each of which will require its
own specific process design.
The large number of courts and scale
of cases handled by Tyler Technologies will accelerate the platform's
2 6
machine learning in this setting.
Tyler Technologies's Vice President of Online Dispute Resolution,
Colin Rule, projects that within ten years, seventy-five percent of civil
cases will be resolved through this type of online process, with only the
very complex and high value cases requiring more traditional face-toface resolution. 7 Modria's acquisition indicates that Tyler is a firm
believer in the potential of ODR, specifically in the court setting and
in the public sector more generally.
229. Carr & Rule, supra note 222.
230. See Kurt Watkins, Tyler Technologies Signs $36 Million Agreement with Cook County,
Illinois, for
Odyssey
Solution,
TYLER
TECHNOLOGIES
(Apr.
25,
2017),
http://investors.tylertech.com/profiles/investor/ResLibraryView.asp?ResLibraryID
83338&GoTopage 1&Category 16&BzID 499&G 320 (noting that 100 million
people across twenty-four states use the case management software).
231. Telephone Interview with Colin Rule, supra note 223.
232. See Odyssey Guide & File, TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, https://www.tylertech.com/
solutions-products/odyssey-product-suite/guide-file (last visited on Oct. 23, 2017)
("Odyssey Guide & File allows courts to develop their own interview process and
electronic forms in order to simplify the filing process for self-represented litigants
while adhering to the court's filing rules.").
233. See Odyssey File & Serve Empowers Paperless Productivity via e-Filing, TYLER
TECHNOLOGIES,
https://www.tylertech.com/solutions-products/odyssey-productsuite /file-serve (lastvisited Oct. 23, 2017) (highlighting the seamless integration of the
tool with the rest of the product suite and noting that the e-filing tool enables
electronic delivery, service, and filing of court documents).
234. Email from Colin Rule, Co-Founder, Modria, to Orna Rabinovich-Einy &
Ethan Katsh, Authors (Aug. 5, 2017) (on file with authors).
235. Telephone Interview with Colin Rule, supra note 223.
236. Email from Colin Rule, supra note 234.
237. Telephone Interview with Colin Rule, supra note 223.
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As we can see, the new new courts described in this section are not
merely more efficient, less expensive, and more accessible versions of
traditional courts, but present a novel institution that could also transform
the characteristics and goals of courts, making them more flexible, less
adversarial, and context-sensitive dispute resolution avenues.
In the following section we explore what makes the new new courts
different from new courts from an access to justice perspective.

C.

New New Courts and Access to Justice

How do the characteristics of the new new courts impact traditional
barriers to access as we have known them? Are the new new courts
more effective in addressing such barriers than the new courts, which
relied on ADR for access enhancement?
The introduction of new technologies in the new new courts creates
opportunities for overcoming barriers for both access and justice in
ways that were not possible in the past. There are three technological
changes taking place that can help courts provide enhanced access to
justice: (1) new efficiencies; (2) increased conveniences and court
capacity for handling cases; and (3) new justice possibilities via
(i) consistency, (ii) a leveled playing field with pre-fixed options,
(iii) language choice, (iv) data collection and subsequent proactive
learning, and (v) improved procedural design.
The first disruptive change involves moving dispute resolution from
a physical setting to a virtual one. The platforms described earlier and
others now under development may provide an all-online forum or
rely on processes that combine online models with physical, face-toface approaches. Both will disrupt the physical boundaries and special
spaces that have symbolized and shaped the view that citizens have had
of court proceedings. In the new new courts, tools will be provided to
individuals to facilitate access to courts, evaluate their legal stance,
communicate with the other party, and have a third-party decide their
dispute, all without having to physically appear in court during court
operating hours. Simply stated, having one's day in court will no
longer require one to actually spend a day physically in a court.
ODR emerged as a response to relatively simple disputes in which
parties were often at a distance. With more sophisticated software, the
range of ODR applications and the very nature of ODR use are
changing. For example, ODR is being employed in local settings, such
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as neighbor disputes.23 8 Evolving software also provides tools for use
in more complex disputes, including divorce proceedings. 2 9 As this
trend continues, conceptual distinctions between conflicts arising
online and those arising offline, and between ADR and ODR, are
evaporating. The historical distinction between formal and informal
avenues for dispute resolution will also likely fade as ADR and other
processes are not physically moved out of court, but rather are
managed by online processes built into a court's platform.
The second disruptive change involves relying less on human
intervention and more on data-driven decision making. This is a shift
that requires careful attention. The use of automated processes can
certainly reduce costs and increase capacity for handling cases;
however, the use of ODR in courts also inserts algorithms into the
judicial process. Algorithms can limit human discretion, increase
consistency, and reduce biases. Designed well, algorithms can enhance
both 'justice" as well as "access, '240 attenuating the efficiency-fairness
trade-off. At the same time, algorithms may also operate in a biased
fashion and their opaqueness can frustrate aspirations ofjustice, as we
further discuss below. 2 1 Whether these possibilities occur will be
traceable to whether we can rigorously monitor the manner in which
such algorithms operate and the values that guide their design.242
The legal profession is increasingly experiencing the disruptive
force of the new technologies as more and more automated systems
provide self-help options to negotiate or mediate a resolution.
Entrepreneurs are discovering that new relationships and new
processes encourage the development of new roles and occupations.243
238. See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing British Columbia's implementation of the
CRT platform).
239. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing The Hague's Rechtwijzer platform).
240. See SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS, supra note 107, at 89 (stating that with
software, the "rules are embedded in the system. Failure to comply is not an option");
see also Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1031-33
(2017) (discussing attempts to use algorithms to achieve more just results in law and
social network access).
241. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249,
1253-55 (2008) (describing the unforeseen problems associated with automation,
such as a lack of record keeping, secrecy, inadequate notice, inaccurate outcomes, and
impairment of rulemaking procedures).
242. See id. at 1308 (noting that transparency and accountability will allow us to
adequately monitor the effectiveness and fairness of algorithms).
243. Compare SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 105, at 2 (reflecting a view that
automation will have a very deep and broad impact on the work of lawyers and the
need for them), with Dana Remus & Frank S. Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?
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These roles are beginning to appear in such applications as
Rechtwijzer, where lawyers are used to monitor the fairness and legality
of agreements negotiated by the parties, and case officers in the United
Kingdom's Online Solutions Court.4 4
In addition, moving from
human decision making to automated processes opens up new
opportunities for programmers and web designers whose work will
reshape ADR and the litigation process. In the design of the CRT
system in British Columbia, for example, emphasis was placed on "user
experiences" when designing the software. 2a This is something that is
obviously important in the access to justice context, but not something
that received attention when processes were in a court building and
dominated by the legal profession. Today, albeit gradually, new
methodologies are being employed to evaluate "user experiences. 246
Input is then incorporated into the design and modification of the
software. While for some, the consumerist language in the court
context can be offsetting, the focus on "users" has allowed groups, such
as non-profits representing pro-se litigants to voice their views on the
design of court processes.
The third change involves a new understanding of the value of data,
commonly referred to as "Big Data," produced during dispute
resolution proceedings. Courts have traditionally collected limited
data on legal claims, but over the last few decades, they have limited
the use of data even more due to confidentiality concerns as ADR was
increasingly being employed in court settings.247 With more reliance
on technology, we are seeing more data being collected and can expect
a shift from courts that focus on "small data"-for example, judicial
opinions and statistical information about numbers and kinds of
cases-to legal environments that are focused on collecting, using, and
reusing Big Data from all cases to improve the performance of courts:

Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law 3-4 (Nov. 30, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 2701092
(conveying a much more reserved view of the impact of automation on lawyering and
lawyers). For a similar skeptical view of the extent of impact of automation, see also
Frank Pasquale, Automating the Professions:
Utopian Pipe Dream or Dystopian
Nightmare?, L.A. REv. BooKs (Mar. 15, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/
automating-the-professions-utopian-pipe-dream-or-dystopian-nightmare.
244. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the emergence of new self-help options,
including the Online Solutions Court and Modria).
245. See supra Section II.B.1.
246. Interview with Darin Thompson & Shannon Salter, supra note 132.
247. Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact, supra note 77, at 263-65.
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better resolve claims and enforce existing rules, develop the law and
potentially prevent disputes from arising to begin with.
The goal of prevention of disputes surfaced in the late 1980s as large
organizations and corporations recognized that the kinds of disputes
2
they experienced, often labor-related disputes, could be anticipated. 1
This insight was not derived from technology-supported data analysis but
depended on the memory of dispute resolvers themselves. As already
noted, ADR practice frowns upon preserving data due to confidentiality
concerns. 249 In courts, unlike ADR, we have available decisions of
judges and statistical data about categories of cases, but no opportunity
and no pressure to broaden the analysis of data. 250 There is almost
nothing that can be easily accessed about small claims courts and state
courts.a 1 With ODR, we will be able to study this data and learn a great
deal about the resolution of these disputes, in and out of court. The
automatic collection and analysis of dispute data will affect concepts,
traditions and values as well as processes. Buried in the data collected
about the large numbers of users will be trends and patterns that were not
identifiable before. Such patterns include important lessons about the
disputants, their habits, conditions that generate success and failure in
dispute resolution, and how to prevent problems in the future.
How do the three shifts associated with the transition from the new
courts to the new new courts affect access to justice? Earlier in this
Article we drew on the typology of access barriers developed by Mor,
consisting of (1) "entry barriers" that exist when accessing the legal system
(e.g., costs, capacity, architecture); (2) a myriad of structural, cultural
and psychological barriers that constrain access to law and parties'
ability to make use of the formal legal system, even where no formal
barrier exists (e.g., proximity to courts and legal services, legal knowledge,

248. CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS
4, 7 (1st ed. 1995); see Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little
About Our Most Important Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 129, 131-32 (discussing
how increased tort litigation contributed to the rise of dispute prevention).
249. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Deconstructing Dispute Classifications: Avoiding the
Shadow of the Law in Dispute System Design in Healthcare,12 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT RESOL.
55, 78-80 (2010) (exploring the benefits of opening up dispute-related data channels
to realize patterns across subject areas such as medical malpractice claims).
250. See Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact, supra note 77, at 292 (highlighting the
pitfalls and lack of accountability of formal dispute resolution mechanisms such as
courts).
251. See Yeazell, supra note 248, at 130 ("[W]e simply know almost nothing about
state judiciaries prior to the 1980s.").
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and language proficiencies); and (3) the barriers that stand in the way of
'Just outcomes" and have to with the structure and content of legal rules
and decisions, all of which shape access to justice (e.g., grievances that
are not recognized as legal wrongs, repeat player effect) .2a2
As explained in the previous section, the new courts were expected
to improve access on all three realms as a consequence of the extensive
adoption of mediation in courts. 2"s The flexible, interest-based process
was expected to reduce costs and physical barriers, as well as
procedural complexity and to allow for non-legal wrongs to be
addressed. 2 4 These characteristics of the mediation process also
2
seemed to make it less susceptible to repeat-player effects. 11
Unfortunately, as we have shown, in reality, court mediation and the
new courts more generally, have at times provided more access at the
expense ofjustice, or, in Mor's terms, greater access to the legal system,
2 6
albeit at a cost to access to law and justice. 5
The new new courts offer the prospect of a fresh equilibrium, one
in which all realms of justice could be enhanced because of the
qualities of digital technology and, in particular, the use of algorithms
and data. In terms of Mor's first realm, access to the legal system is
greatly enhanced in ODR because processes are conducted from
anywhere one has access to the internet-a home, an office, or a park
for that matter, and at any hour of the day, any day of the week. This
not only eliminates physical barriers, but also significantly reduces
direct and indirect costs of participation.
In addition, use of online automated processes frees courts from the
constraints of limited space and human capacity, allowing for huge
numbers of claims to be processed. The freedom from these
constraints was previously unfathomable for human decision makers
operating from a physical space where parties had to convene.
For some parties, access to online systems (or lack of access) is itself
a barrier; however, when access is available through phones instead of
personal computers, these concerns are significantly mitigated.a 7
Also, the provision of assistance in designated kiosks at the courts and

252. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
253. See Mor, supra note 55 (manuscript at 21).
254. See Menkel-Meadow, Semi-Formal,supra note 21, at 432.
255. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Section I.A.
257. Prescott, Improving Access, supra note 187 (manuscript at 16) (noting that
phones increase access to ODR systems for low-income individuals because eighty-four
percent of low-income individuals have access to smart phones).
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in legal aid centers can overcome many of the concerns associated with
the digital divide, the split between those with and without internet
access. Over time, this divide has become more of a generational
divide than a socio-economic one, as evidenced by the high
penetration of internet access via mobile technology in third world
countries. 251
In terms of access to the law, Mor's second realm of access,
algorithms and data offer a remarkable contribution, as evidenced in
the various types of "triage" systems developed by online courts and
pilot projects. These tools allow parties whose knowledge of the law
and legalese is quite limited to navigate their way through legal rules
and procedures by answering simple questions and receiving clear,
individualized answers and advice.2 59 Parties are offered pre-fixed
options for answers, further leveling the playing field for those who
have difficulty in wording accurate and relevant responses to the
questions posed. 2 0 There are also open text boxes in which parties
261
can add to the templates provided.
The advice provided through such tools as the Solutions Explorer of
the CRT is reachable from afar at no cost, bridging geographic
distances and the center-periphery divide. Data collected from party
responses is analyzed and allows the court system to refine and improve
such tools to further reduce barriers and enhance access.
In addition, access to justice, Mor's third realm of access, can be
improved in several ways. For one, the triage systems refer parties to
both legal and non-legal avenues for addressing their problems,
helping the parties obtain remedies for those grievances that do not
amount to legal wrongs.26 2

258. See, e.g., Cell Phones in Africa: Communication Lifeline, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 15,
2015),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/04/15/cell-phones-in-africacommunication-lifeline (reporting that out of seven African countries surveyed
between five and thirty-four percent of residents owned a smartphone); Roland Banks,
Mobile Technology Is Improving Lifefor Those in Developing Nations, MOBILE INDUSTRY REV.
(May
22,
2015),
https://www.mobileindustryreview.com/2015/05/mobiletechnology-developing-nations.html (claiming that ninety-seven percent of surveyed
individuals in developing countries "say that the mobile [i]nternet has transformed
their lives").
259. See Cabral et al., supra note 112, at 249-51 (discussing the benefits of web-based
legal services).
260. Id. at 251.
261. Id. at 249.
262. Id. at 297.
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Second, the introduction of algorithms can help level the playing
field between sophisticated repeat players and one-shotters. Fixed
procedural options incorporated into the software can mitigate repeat
players' procedural advantages and algorithmic interventions can
reduce human bias;26 this combination could result in improved legal
outcomes for traditionally disempowered parties. Analyzing collected
data could also help ensure that these goals are met by studying the
impact of particular design choices in the procedural realm on the
substantive outcomes of particular legal disputes, including those
involving claimants belonging to suspect groups (e.g., women,
minorities, consumers) .264
Third, by having new voices, groups, and professions involved in the
design of ODR processes, the process has the potential to incorporate
values and norms that address the needs and rights of those groups
whose voices are unheard in the design of traditional court processes.
This is significant because procedural avenues and choices inevitably
impact and shape legal outcomes.
Moreover, where individuals pursue a claim that could be relevant
to a larger group of potential claimants, the other claimants need not
wait for such claims to arise to receive a remedy. The ODR system can
instead require defendants to compensate those harmed who have not
yet sued (and may not even be aware of the harm). One could even
imagine that an ODR system could require defendants to prevent such
harm from recurring in the future, thereby performing a preventative
function. Such actions by ODR providers would address the problem
of legal consciousness and could bring about a real change in the
equilibrium of legal outcomes for different social groups.
Last, by studying the types of problems that are consistently referred
out of the system, one could recognize which grievances impact the
lives of individuals but are not yet recognized as legal wrongs. Thus,
presenting an opportunity to discuss whether they merit recognition.
As we can see, adopting technology in the courtroom could change
the very nature of court processes, with software being employed to
evaluate degrees of success in preventing claims.
The three shifts described above present a promise for transforming
our very understanding of the meaning of justice: from courts being
associated with buildings and halls shifting to ones that operate online;
from courts relying on human intervention to ones that employ

263. See supra note 240.
264. See KATSH &RABINOVICH-EINY,

DIGITALJUSTICE,

supra note 151, at 49.
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automation; and from courts as institutions that collect very little data
and focus on individual cases to ones that collect and study Big Data.
In this new reality, the focus moves from dispute resolution and the
development of law through individual claims, to the rigorousness of
proactive dispute prevention efforts and the study of Big Data to make
law more responsive to diverse populations, improve the rule of law,
and encourage greater effectiveness of regulatory regimes.
Private platforms, such as those in the e-commerce space, have had
a head start in both ODR and online dispute prevention.2 6a The public
sector-not only courts but also state and local agencies-has begun
to recognize the value of online processes and the dispute-related data
that is being collected in the course of interacting with users. 266 The
potential of online systems for both enhancing efficiency and justice is
gradually being recognized, buoying efforts to implement such systems
in U.S. courts, as evidenced by the Tyler Technologies-Modria merger
and the impressive growth of Matterhorn.2 67
Despite this potential, digital technology in general, and the use of
ODR in courts in particular, is far from a panacea. Its workings depend
on the design of court ODR systems, the operation of algorithms, and
how institutions make use of the gathered data.
Various researchers have shown that algorithms can operate in a
discriminatory and inconsistent fashion. These findings raise serious
due process and equality challenges.26" Algorithms can rely on skewed

265. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, How Nextdoor Reduced Racist Postsby 75%, SPLINTER (Aug.
25. 2016, 11:55 AM), https://splinternews.com/how-nextdoor-reduced-racist-posts-by75-1793861389 (discussing dispute prevention efforts on Nextdoor, a social
networking site for neighborhoods, which publicized that it has reduced racial posts
by seventy-five percent through changes to its interface by posing additional questions
to users who post messages to the site's Crime and Safety forum).
266. Colin Rule & Mark Wilson, Online Resolution and Citizenship Empowerment:
Property Tax Appeals in North American, in REVOLUTIONIZING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
STATE AND CITIZENS THROUGH DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 185, 188 (Sam B. Edwards III
ed. 2014) (stating that the "conventional wisdom" that citizens prefer to engage with
government agencies in person is giving way to a recognition that "user preferences
have shifted to online channels").
267. See supra notes 182-97, 237-52 and accompanying text.
268. See Citron, supra note 241, at 1253-54; Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren,
Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STANFORD TECH. L. REv. 473
(2017); Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to
Examine Efficiency and Fairnessin Automated and OpaqueDecision Making, 41 ScI., TECH.
& HUM. VALUES 118, 122-23 (2015).
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databases,26 9 reflect the programmer's own biases in their design,2 70
and, perhaps most disturbingly, operate in unpredictable ways, in
particular when we are dealing with learning algorithms.27 1
Other causes for concern have to do with the collection and study of
data. The preservation of broad categories of data, and the ability to
cross-check such data and study it, generate important insights on
groups of individuals, on cases, and on processes and outcomes;
however, the collection of data may also prove intrusive and harmful
in terms of individual privacy. It has been shown that anonymization
has its limits in Big Data settings and the risk of de-anonymization is
real.272 Another related fear has to do with the security and
authenticity of information, the existence of effective means for
ensuring the accuracy of data, and the integrity and safety from leaks
and hacking attempts. 27s Also, given the value of dispute data, the
concern arises about such information being shared-whether for
commercial purposes or not-with private or public entities, and used
in a discriminatory fashion. 274 These issues are being addressed in
those new new courts that are being established, but will require
ongoing attention and refinement of rules and practices.
Finally, a related concern has to do with the use of Big Data for
dispute prevention-related activity. This is unchartered territory in
courts and requires rigorous thinking about the ethical and regulatory
269. See Kate Crawford &Jason Schultz, BigData andDue Process: Toward a Framework
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 120 (2014) (noting that bias
present in datasets can affect algorithms used to query Big Data thus spurring privacy
concerns).
270. Id. at 105.
271. Id. at 99.
272. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large
Sparse Datasets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY & PRIVACY
111, 111 (2008) (exploring the limits of Big Data by analyzing the applicability of deanonymization to Netflix user data). For a more general analysis, see Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Respondingto the SurprisingFailureofAnonymization, 57 UCLAL. REV.
1701,
1717-22 (2010), which highlights three high-profile examples of
deanonymization of data kept by sophisticated private and governmental entities.
273. Regarding accuracy of data, see KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE,
supranote 151, at 94-95, for a description of the scope of errors in healthcare data and
the lack of effective means for amending such errors.
274. See, e.g., Online Pharmacy Fined for Selling Customer Data, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34570720
(reporting
on
the
unauthorized sale of private customer data by an online pharmacy to marketing
companies); see also Crawford & Schultz, supra note 269, at 99-103 (examining the use
of Big Data to implement discriminatory practices by companies secretly targeting a
specific demographic at the exclusion of others).

212

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:165

275

guidelines for such activities.
The opacity that surrounds these
activities in the private sector need not and should not characterize
them in the court setting. Indeed, in our view, transparency regarding
such activities and the rules governing them could be an important
step in the development of a public online dispute resolution and
prevention model that could help shape more equitable practices in
the private sector as well.
While algorithms and data present serious challenges and open the
door to abuse, they also present extraordinary opportunities for
enhancing access tojustice through a careful and measured approach.
When we evaluate this new direction, we must remember that our
traditional, brick-and-mortar courts have presented insurmountable
barriers for large sections of our population. The challenges that lie
ahead should guide us in designing our future justice system, but
should not deter us from embracing the new new courts.
CONCLUSION

Each of the shifts associated with the new new courts holds
enormous potential for increasing access to justice. Each also creates
opportunities for frustrating access and giving rise to barriers and
injustice. On the one hand, efficiency and justice can be enhanced by
enabling easy, distant, and round-the-clock communication without
having to miss work and pay for travel. The simple language and
tailored options offered in the newly designed platforms also allow
unrepresented parties to better understand their rights and options
and figure out their interests and needs.
In addition, the enhanced capacity associated with automated
processes that are not dependent on human capacity or on physical
space allows for huge numbers of claims to be processed, providing
access to some avenue of dispute resolution for problems that in the
276
past were in the "lump it" category.
The involvement of new voices in the design phase-representatives
of disempowered groups, new professions-can broaden the types of
problems that are addressed by the system, as well as enrich procedural
275. See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITALJUSTICE, supra note 151, at 53 (stating
that "[t]he same qualities of prevention-related activities that make quality control
efforts possible also raise serious concerns about data protection and the privacy of
users").

276. ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING
CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 97 (1st ed. 2001) (addressing the potential impact of online
filing of complaints on the airing of such problems).
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choices, linguistic avenues, and visual representation of legal
information and avenues of redress.
Also, the pre-designed algorithmic options and pre-configuration
associated with software can help curb some of the biases associated with
human decision making, resulting perhaps in more fair outcomes for
various parties. Often, Big Data allows monitoring of the quality of
processes and outcomes, uncovers biases and problems in the
operation of dispute resolution algorithms, and even provides for dispute
prevention. Instead of waiting for human third parties to analyze their
experiences post-dispute resolution, the data can uncover disputes
before parties are aware of them, in some cases, even before they occur.
It can also indicate more broadly whose problems are not being addressed
within the legal system and signal the need for the law to generate
appropriate legal categories and provide redress for such grievances.
On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that for some people and
some problems, digital communication is still unavailable and
inaccessible. While the digital divide has become less of a problem
with the spread of smartphones and the change in preferences
regarding online use, there is still a group for whom such
communication remains out of reach.2 77
More significantly, perhaps, are the potential biases and lack of
transparency associated with algorithms, in particular learning
algorithms.2 71 While some solutions have been brought forth, this
challenge seems far from resolved and will need to be addressed
seriously as our reliance on algorithms continues to increase.2 79
The adoption of ODR in courts is operating somewhat like a Trojan
horse. The assumption was that it would improve courts' efficiency
277. See The Digital Divide, ICT, and Broadband Internet, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/linksl0.htm
(last visited on Oct. 23, 2017)
(noting that barriers to internet usage in developing countries include limited access
to Information and Communications Technologies and low literacy rates among
significant segments of the population).
278. See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 886 (2016) (noting that certain learning
algorithms are so complex that the programmers do not even understand why certain
results are reached); Kevin Roose, Facebook's FrankensteinMoment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/technology/facebook-frankensteinsandberg-ads.html (discussing issues surrounding the unpredictability of Facebook's
algorithms, including accusations that the algorithms aided Russia's influence in the
2016 U.S. election, censored Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, and assisted human
traffickers in Africa).
279. For a discussion of the limitations of the transparency of algorithms as a
solution to bias, see Chander, supra note 240, at 1040.
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and further enhance access to justice without changing courts'
course-much like the impact of the institutionalization of ADR in the
past. This might have been possible with the first generation of court
ODR processes, but will be difficult to sustain in the new new courts
that are now emerging and are adopting state of the art ODR systems
which rely heavily on algorithms, offer new types of processes, involve
new types of actors in the design of the systems, and remain closely
attuned to data. 80
Despite the change in courts' modus operandi and their enhanced
capacity to process claims, the bulk of societal disputes will continue to
be addressed outside the court system. As a growing portion of our
lives takes place online, our disputes will also require online
mechanisms for addressing them, the majority of which will not be
court-connected . 2 1 The emergence of a public ODR model that is
grounded in the court system will be crucial to ensure that individual
problems are resolved in a fair and just manner. This holds true not
only in the courts, but also in the private sector where mega-platforms
are already addressing hundreds of millions of disputes annually
through largely automated systems lacking in transparency.
Contemporaneously with the growth of online systems in the private
sector we are seeing the realization that such systems are also needed
in the public sector. While online court systems are still seen as the
exception and have generated heated debates, we can expect the
consensus over such systems to grow over time. At the moment,
algorithms are not a substitute forjudicial resolution, which continues
to be human-based. It remains to be seen whether the distinction
between software occupying a facilitative role as opposed to a
determinative role will persist, or whether it will be diluted much in
the same way that the online-offline or formal-informal divides have
been attenuated.

280. See supra Section ll.B.
281. Even if access to courts is increased dramatically, the majority of disputes would
still be addressed through alternative fora, as encapsulated in the following statement
by Lawrence Friedman:
[H] ow much access to justice do we really want? Let us try to imagine a world
in which everyone who had any claim whatsoever could get a hearing, had
inexpensive and convenient access to counsel, and presumably could get his
claim resolved in his favor. Would this be a good society? It could be an
Orwellian nightmare.
Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 3, 7 (2010).
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We are in the midst of a deep change in our courts. Novel court
processes are emerging, ones that are less adversarial, more flexible,
dynamic, accessible, transparent and efficient, and hopefully, more
balanced. Courts employing technology in this way should strive to
enhance both access and justice, as well as both efficiency and fairness.
Figuring out what exactly constitutes a fair process in this day and
age-what "a day in court" means, which elements provide disputants
with "voice," what generates trust, and what constitutes neutrality, and
the like-is the step we must take now, even as our understanding of
such concepts and values changes.

